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CHAPTER I 
IRTRODUCTIOR: AR OVERVIEW OF THE 
RULLIFICATIOR CRISIS 
"Our Federal Union: it must be preserved." 
Andrew Jackson 
"The Union: next to our liberty, most dear." 
John c. Calhoun 
Ominous ideological differences existed in the states' 
rights doctrines of the two highest officials in the United 
States. These differences had major consequences for the 
serenity of the Union during the early 1830s. South 
Carolina threatened to nullify a federal law, threatening 
the nation with civil war. Other southern states, however, 
did not support the South Carolinians. Her closest 
neighbor, North Carolina, exemplified the quandry those in 
the South faced: vocal support of states' rights in 
opposition to the tariff, maintenance of the right to 
secession (the ultimate empowerment of states' rights), and 
devotion to the Union, which denied the state that right. 
The Nullification Crisis defined the states' rights 
sentiments of North Carolina's politicians. 
Because of its strategic location (in that any federal 
troops used to suppress South Carolina would have to move 
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through the state), North Carolina seems ideally situated to 
exhibit the diversity of states' rights thought in the South 
during the nullification crisis. While other scholars have 
written on the topics of nullification and North Carolina 
politics, none have explicitely studied the role of the 
state during the controversy. William Freehling's study of 
the South Carolina nullification movement postulates that 
there were several factors, a greater number of blacks than 
whites, cooperation between piedmont and tidewater planters, 
and recent economic failures, that made South Carolina 
unique and able to accept nullification. Richard Ellis 
contends that the crisis did not mark a conflict between 
nationalists and states' rightists, but between two states' 
rights groups. William Hoffman concludes that the 
nullification controversy affected North Carolina only by 
ridding the Jacksonians of undesirable elements of radicals 
in the party. Finally, Kermalene Brown stresses that the 
resolutions adopted by the North Carolina state legislature 
in January 1833 were a strong disavowal of nullification.1 
In November 1832, while most Americans were rallying to 
the campaign of Andrew Jackson, the state of South Carolina 
adopted the Ordinance of Nullification. This was not a 
spurious act; it was the culmination of measures that had 
been developing for many years. An important predecessor 
was the fermentation of anti-tariff sentiment. The reaction 
to the Tariff of Abominations, passed in 1828, was strong 
enough that by 1830, there was virtual consensus in South 
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Carolina as to the injustice of the protective system. 
Nevertheless, during the time preceding November 1832, there 
were large portions of the state divided on how to redress 
its grievances. Some had faith in the system as it existed 
and willingly left the question to the sense of fair play of 
the American people and Congress. These "Unionists" felt 
that the Supreme Court would eventually rule the tariff 
unconstitutional.2 Above all, the Unionists relied on 
President Andrew Jackson to reduce the tariff if no other 
federal branch did. This support of Jackson increased as 
the ensuing crisis developed. 
Likewise, there were those whose faith in the system 
languished. This group saw resistance as its only hope for 
successful redress. The most conservative of this group 
wanted to call a southern convention to discuss the tariff 
issue. The most radical promoted immediate disunion. In 
between, was a group that favored interposition by the state 
legislature between the federal government and the people of 
the state. This group formed the States Rights and Jackson 
Party in 1828. But later, after the Jefferson Day dinner in 
1830 where Jackson proclaimed his true sentiments that above 
all it was necessary to preserve the Union, the party became 
the States Rights and Free Trade Party. George McDuffie was 
the leading spokesman for the party until John C. Calhoun, 
then the country's vice-president, went public with the 
ideas he had previously published anonymously as the South 
Carolina Exposition and Protest in 1828.3 
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The two parties showed great enthusiasm and vigor in 
denouncing each other and recruiting new members. South 
Carolina newspapers backed their sentiments, Union or 
Nullifier. The wording of the Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions of 1798 (responses to the Alien and Sedition 
Laws, which posited that a state had the right to declare a 
law of Congress to be unconstitutional and "null and void" 
in that state), the opinions of Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison, and the discussion during the framing of the 
Constitution itself were scrutinized thoroughly in an 
attempt to credit or discredit the constitutionality of 
nullification. Unionists looked to the future, prophesizing 
disunion and civil war as the probable results of such a 
doctrine as nullification. States Rightists looked at the 
present, urging that it was better to take action and 
perhaps fail than to submit and face the consequences of 
oppression.4 
In 1830, in an important test of strength, the States 
Rights Party proposed that a state convention be called by 
the state legislature. The purpose of the convention was 
ill-defined, but was based on the premise of vigorous action 
in protest of the tariff. When the legislature met there 
was a majority, but not the required two thirds in favor of 
the convention. Thus, the States Rightists settled for 
passing (by overwhelming majorities) strong resolutions 
based upon the states' rights program. The votes to call 
the convention showed that the States Rights Party was a 
5 
small majority, and that the Unionists were strongest in the 
western and northern counties ~here slavery was least 
prevalent.5 
During the two years between legislative elections, 
both parties campaigned hard for their particular platform, 
both in South Carolina and in the rest of the South. The 
States Rights Party had a measure of success in South 
Carolina, but other states reacted with deliberate cool to 
the doctrine of nullification. As 1832 neared, South 
Carolinians waited to see if Congress would take any action 
to reduce the tariff. The reduction of the Tariff of 1828 
was almost a certainty because the federal government was 
running a surplus of income over expenditures. Further, the 
federal debt, which was a major reason for the tariff 
initially, was almost liquidated by this time. When the 
debt was retired, which at the present rate would occur 
during the next presidential term,. the surplus of revenue 
would become a major problem for the federal government.6 
Congress considered a number of bills before agreeing 
on a new tariff in 1832. This tariff differed from the 1828 
"Tariff of Abominations" by cutting non-protective duties by 
several millions of dollars per year. While average duties 
declined from 41 percent to 33 percent, the new tariff in a 
large sense left the protective features of the Tariff of 
1828 alone. The congressional vote was similar in the 
adoption of the new tariff as to the previous votes on the 
issue (northern states for and southern states, minus 
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Louisiana, against) except for the votes from Virginia and 
North Carolina. Some Congressmen from these states voted 
for the tariff because it was a reduction, albeit less than 
desired.? 
In South Carolina, both Unionists and the States Rights 
parties claimed vindication with the new tariff. The States 
Rightists claimed that the new tariff showed to all that 
Congress intended to make protection a permanent part of 
national policy. Unionists celebrated the reductions and 
looked forward to further reductions in the future.B 
After an overwhelming victory in the South Carolina 
legislative elections of 1832, States Rightists called for a 
convention with the added confidence of numbers. This time, 
the issue was clear cut: the States Rights Party wanted a 
state convention expressly to nullify the tariff, while the 
Unionists wanted a southern convention by which they hoped 
to be able to coerce the northern protectionists to 
compromise further on the tariff issue. Things moved 
quickly. Pro-nullification Governor James Hamilton, Jr. 
called an extra session of the legislature, and by votes of 
ninety-six to twenty-five in the House and thirty-one to 
thirteen in the Senate, a convention was called to meet in 
November. After the legislative election, the Unionists put 
up only a weak fight to keep the convention from being 
called, and only a few were elected as delegates to it.9 
The convention followed closely the theory of 
nullification outlined in the South Carolina Exposition and 
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Protest and further developed by Calhoun in his public 
letter to Governor Hamilton on July 28, 1831. In these 
works, Calhoun discussed what he thought were the greatest 
dangers to democratic government and proposed a plan to 
alleviate them. To save democracy, restraints must be 
placed on the will of the majority to maintain the rights of 
a large minority against the tyranny of numbers. He did 
not, however, proclaim the need for disunion or revolution, 
like many of the more radical nullifiers.10 
Calhoun's plan began with the assertion that a state 
had the right to declare a federal law that it considered 
unconstitutional to be null and void within the borders of 
the state. If the federal government refused to recognize 
its iniquity and attempted to force the state into 
compliance, the state could legally and peacefully enforce 
its nullification. After maintaining the doctrine through 
the state courts by binding every citizen (including judges) 
to the right of interposition, Calhoun sought to keep the 
case out of federal court by having the state refuse to file 
the proper paperwork. Thus, the state could interpose 
itself between the oppressive federal government and the 
state's oppressed citizenry. Calhoun's ideal was not 
military confrontation, but a conflict of moral and 
constitutional views. Secession was not necessarily the end 
result of one state's stand against the federal government, 
because three-fourths of the states could agree to amend the 
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Constitution into compliance with the federal government's 
law, thus forcing the state into acquiescence.11 
Recent history showed that two states, South Carolina 
and Georgia, had already put the theory of nullification to 
practice and successfully thwarted the federal government. 
In both the South Carolina quarantine of Negro sailors in 
1828 and the Georgia removal of Indians in 1832, states' 
rights arguments were effectively used to nullify federal 
laws. Neither violence nor civil war followed.12 
The South Carolina convention in November 1832 adopted 
the Ordinance of Nullification by a vote on 136 to 26. In 
this document, the state proclaimed the tariffs of 1828 and 
1832 to be null and void, disallowed the duties to be 
enforced by federal agents, and prohibited the appeal from 
state courts to federal court any case having to do with 
nullification. The Ordinance also forced state workers to 
take a loyalty oath to the state of South Carolina and its 
policies, and declared that the people of South Carolina 
would be absolved from relations with the other states of 
the Union if the federal government tried to enforce its 
laws by military force. Finally, in an appeal to the people 
of the state and the southern people in general, the 
convention drafted addresses that stressed the injustice of 
the tariff, the peaceful and constitutional nature of 
nullification, the strong ties of friendship between South 
Carolina and the Union, and indicated that the return to a 
solely revenue tariff with a 12 percent rate would meet the 
state's demands. The Ordinance was to go into effect on 
February 1, 1833.13 
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Shortly after adopting the Ordinance of Nullification, 
the South Carolina convention passed supporting legislation. 
The Replevin Act sought to establish a means by which a 
merchant could retrieve his goods from abroad without paying 
duties, and it sought to block the means of appeal in such 
cases from state to federal court. The Militia Act was 
established so that the state could defend itself in the 
case of federal invasion. The Test Oath Act provided the 
state government insurance that all state employees would be 
loyal to the state by providing for their removal if they 
failed to take the oath. The Unionists, meanwhile, 
organized into military companies, while their leader, Joel 
Poinsett, corresponded with President Andrew Jackson. With 
both sides arming, South Carolina faced both civil war 
within and invasion from without.14 
President Jackson responded to South Carolina's 
Ordinance by issuing his Nullification Proclamation to the 
people of South Carolina. This paper was a combination of 
"carrot and stick;" it was a persuasive appeal to public 
opinion and a clear statement that the president intended to 
carry out his duty to enforce the laws of the land. On 
December 20, the new governor, Robert Y. Hayne, and the 
South Carolina legislature defiantly replied to Jackson. 
Nullification would go into effect, as planned, on February 
1, 1833. Military preparations moved ahead rapidly 
throughout the remainder of the year.15 
10 
As the day set for nullification became immanent, it 
was increasingly clear that President Jackson and the 
federal government intended to enforce the revenue laws in 
South Carolina either peacefully or otherwise. It was also 
obvious that other southern states, while disagreeing with 
the tariff and promoting states' rights, did not support 
South Carolina in nullifying a federal law. Further, it was 
apparent that there was a growing movement in Congress to 
reduce the tariff to alleviate discontent in the South. In 
the face of these facts, the South Carolina legislature 
voted a reprieve for the enforcement of nullification, 
evidently to see what Congress would do in regard to the 
tariff.l6 
With a reprieve granted, Congress worked out a 
compromise. When the Verplanck Bill, a tariff bill 
sponsored by the President, was introduced to the House, 
protectionists deemed its tariff reductions as too rapid, 
and then amended it into an unmanageable form. The bill was 
finally tabled when Kentucky Senator Henry Clay, seeking 
political plaudits again as the Great Compromiser, 
introduced a substitute measure that, with Calhoun's aid, 
passed both houses in two weeks. It provided for a more 
gradual reduction of duties over a ten-year period at the 
end of which the rate would remain at 20 percent.l7 
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While debating the Verplanck Bill and the Compromise 
Tariff, Congress also considereq a special bill submitted by 
the president that requested enlarged powers for dealing 
with the nullification crisis. Because of its request for 
increased executive authority to use the armed forces, this 
act became known as the Force Bill. It passed both houses 
on March 1, 1833. The next day, Jackson signed both the 
Force Bill and the Compromise Tariff into law, giving South 
Carolina the choice between compromise and invasion.18 
The South Carolina convention reassembled on March 11, 
1833 and under the influence of John C. Calhoun, accepted 
the compromise. On the same day, the convention rescinded 
the Ordinance of Nullification by a vote of 153 to 4. But 
all of the fire had not gone out of the nullifiers. Next, 
the South Carolinians, in an act of futile bravado, adopted 
a new ordinance nullifying the Force Bill. Jackson, 
somewhat uncharacteristically, chose to ignore this 
challenge to his authority, and the nullification crisis 
ended.19 
In South Carolina's sister state to the north, North 
Carolina politics were so docile prior to the nullification 
controversy that it was referred to as the "Rip Van Winkle" 
state.20 On the national level, North Carolina politicians 
were seen to be dominated by Virginia policies.21 Within 
the state, a strong adherance to states' rights -- no 
tariff, no Bank of the United States, and no internal 
improvements funded by the federal government -- typified 
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the east. Andrew Jackson was the national candidate of 
choice there. In the western, mountainous part of the 
state, a National Republican faction dominated. It 
generally supported Henry Clay against Jackson, and was pro-
Bank, for internal improvements, and advocated the tariff. 
As the vast majority of the people lived in the east, Old 
Hickory was the overwhelming favorite of the people. He 
even enjoyed popularity in the west, where his frontier 
image made him acceptable to otherwise hostile National 
Republicans.22 
The quiet domesticity of North Carolina politics 
changed when Jackson dismissed the popular North Carolinian 
John Branch from his cabinet in April 1831 due to his 
involvement in the "Eaton Imbroglio." Branch, the Secretary 
of the Navy and one of Calhoun's cronies, saw John Eaton as 
a rival to Jackson's favors and, therefore, was very pointed 
in some of his remarks regarding the Eaton marriage.23 Upon 
dismissal, Branch returned to North Carolina and went about 
prosecuting a campaign in the press stressing his 
indignation over the whole affair. The final result of the 
many public letters written by Branch, Jackson, Calhoun, and 
Eaton was that a split developed between Branch and his 
admirers and the regular Democrats in North Carolina who 
idolized Jackson. Branch wasted no time in returning to 
prominence in the state, being elected without opposition 
(other candidates dropped out of the race) to the United 
States House of Representatives in December 1832.24 
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By the beginning of 1832, although no political parties 
had yet formed in North Carolina, there were three distinct 
factions in the state.25 The regular Democrats, led by 
Romulus Saunders and Richard Dobbs Spaight, were the 
majority. They supported the traditional themes of states' 
rights and Andrew Jackson, even when his policies were not 
strictly states' rights. When Calhoun became obviously 
opposed to Old Hickory, they denounced the South Carolinian 
and praised Martin Van Buren, Jackson's choice for vice 
president in the 1832 election. Their major presses were 
the Fayetteville Journal, the New Bern Sentinel (edited by 
Thomas Watson), and the Raleigh Constitutionalist (edited by 
Charles Ramsey). In the House of Representatives, Lauchlin 
Bethune, Henry Connor, Thomas H. Hall, Micajah Hawkins, 
James McKay, Jesse Speight were Jacksonians, as was Bedford 
Brown in the Senate (see figure 1).26 
The Branch ring split off from the regular Democrats. 
This group was a loose coalition that included Old 
Federalists, Democrats (both pro-Jackson and pro-Calhoun), 
Independent Republicans (the voters in the western part of 
the state who agreed with the policies of the American 
System but liked Andrew Jackson as well), members of the 
National Republican faction, and nullifiers. Only the 
strong leadership of Democrats Branch; James Iredell, Jr.; 
National Republican Thomas Polk; and nullifier Samuel Sawyer 
held this widely disparate group together. Some of their 
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different views on the American System than the Democrats, 
pro-Calhounists (who did not admit Calhoun's authorship of 
nullification), and open nullifiers who all promoted states' 
rights in various forms. Until the election of 1832, only 
one thing united these fragments -- distaste for Martin Van 
Buren. The Branch group's main purpose in the election was 
to promote Phillip Barbour, a states• rights Democrat from 
Virginia, as Jackson's vice president. The underlying goal 
of Branch himself was to get John Calhoun elected president 
in 1836. The principle newspapers cooperating with the 
Branch faction were the Raleigh Star and the Fayetteville 
Observer (edited by Edward J. Hale). Members of this 
faction in the North Carolina congressional delegation were 
Branch, Samuel Carson, Abraham Rencher, and Senator Willie 
P. Mangum.27 
The third faction in North Carolina politics 
sympathized with Henry Clay and the National Republicans. 
At first, this faction allied with the Branch group in 
opposition to Jackson and Van Buren. They encouraged such a 
split in the Jackson ranks, because they saw that that was 
the only way in which their candidates, Henry Clay and John 
Sergeant, could win. By the summer of 1832, they split from 
the Branch coalition because of ideological differences. As 
a result, the Branch faction and the National Republican 
bloc evenly split the 29 percent of the North Carolina votes 
that the Jackson/Van Buren ticket did not get in November 
1832. Their presses were the New Bern Spectator, and the 
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Raleigh Register. Augustine Shepperd, William Shepard, 
Lewis Williams, and Daniel Barringer can be loosely 
identified with this group, although they are more readily 
identified as "Independents" or "Anti-Jackson men."28 
By 1832, then, there were three distinct groups in 
North Carolina politics. Both the regular Democrats, who 
were moderate, and the more radical Branch group advocated 
states' rights. The National Republican faction promoted 
the nationalistic doctrines of the American System. 
Further complicating this situation was the 
nullification controversy. No sooner had the election of 
1832 ended than South Carolina posted its Ordinance of 
Nullification. While Branch and the other hard core pro-
Calhounists stuck by South Carolina, more of the Branch 
fragments split off over the incident. The Branch group 
maintained a solid states' rights stand. Some were 
nullifiers, while some believed in a state's right to 
secede. All denounced the federal government's right to 
subdue a "sovereign state" militarily. At the same time, 
the National Republican ring and regular Democrats sang a 
duet of Jackson's praises and nullification blasphemies. 
The regular Democrats generally disapproved of 
nullification, but were equally anti-tariff. Furthermore, 
Jackson's Force Bill complicated the issue because they also 
professed a strong attachment to states' rights. The only 
way out for this group,which fragmented considerably under 
these contending pressures, was a compromise tariff. 
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Eventually, they got it, but from a man they found it hard 
to praise, the "Father of the .?illlerican System," Henry 
Clay.29 
The National Republican faction did not escape the 
confusion. After a lopsided defeat by Jackson and the 
Democrats in the fall of 1832, they must have found it very 
difficult to sing Jackson's praises that winter. Because of 
the threat nullification posed to the tariff and the 
American System, Jackson's strong stand against South 
Carolina was lauded by National Republicans. Just when they 
and the regular Democrats reached a crescendo in their 
praise, Henry Clay, the party's hero, stepped in. Clay's 
compromise put the National Republicans in another 
embarrassing position. First, they had praised their 
nemesis, now they condemned their hero. Advocates of the 
protective system saw the Compromise Tariff as unnecessary. 
Why had Clay interceded just when South Carolina was over 
the barrel and Andrew Jackson was about to play into their 
hands twice over by squashing the nullification heresy and 
by making himself into an unpopular tyrant in the process?30 
The nullification crisis, along with the Compromise 
Tariff and Force Bill, proved to be an important event in 
North Carolina politics. Andrew Jackson's actions alienated 
many in the state and helped North Carolinians to define 
more precisely their feelings on things such as states' 
rights and the concept of Union. As a result, some of the 
most powerful leaders of the Branch group who identified 
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closely with Calhoun and nullification saw their political 
careers in North Carolina ended by the fallout from the 
controversy. 
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CALHOUN'S VIEWS ON NULLIFICATION 
AND THE ELECTION OF 1832 
"There is but little nullification in North Carolina." 
Edward J. Bale 
Throughout 1831 and 1832, North Carolinians were 
consistently against both the tariff and South Carolina's 
doctrine of nullification. The real struggle within the 
state centered upon how and if such a precarious states' 
rights stance could be maintained. On the one hand, North 
Carolina legislators petitioned, begged, and threatened in 
regard to disestablishing or modifying the tariff. On the 
other, North Carolinians for the most part condemned 
nullification as subversive of the Union. Apparently, 
threatening disunion was one thing, actively taking a stand 
against "unconstitutional" laws another. Until South 
Carolina published the Ordinance of Nullification in 
Nov~mber 1832, North Carolina ''policy" was free to blow 
about in the breeze, searching for justification for all 
actions and words. 
As early as 1828, North Carolina's legislative policy 
was against the tariff. In the vote for the "Tariff of 
22 
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Abominations," its congressional delegation consistently and 
unanimously voted against it.1 ,As South Carolina took the 
lead in protesting the tariff and called upon her sister 
states for aid, North Carolina Governor Hutchins Burton 
declared that "the dignity and interest of the State 
requires that North Carolina should not be silent."2 The 
General Assembly acted on Burton's request by adopting a 
resolution that claimed Congress had no power to lay a 
protective duty, as opposed to a revenue duty, on imported 
goods under Article 1, Section 10 of the Constitution.3 
Throughout the next five years, North Carolina consistently 
upheld this view, but when given the chance to take direct 
action on the tariff during the nullification crisis, the 
state balked. Despite unanimity against the tariff, the 
Union was more important. 
Before John C. Calhoun's letter admitting his 
authorship of the South Carolina Exposition and Protest, 
many North Carolinians believed that Calhoun was not the 
author of the doctrine of nullification. The Carolina 
Observer claimed that "it is yet to be proven that Mr. 
Calhoun is a Nullifier, and ... we do not believe he is." 
This statement was prompted by a letter to the editors from 
"An Original Clay Man" who claimed Calhoun's doctrine doomed 
his ambition to be president.4 The Roanoke Advocate became 
the principle Calhoun press and the only one in North 
Carolina to stay unabashedly with him through the 
nullification crisis. In August 1831, after Calhoun's 
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pronouncement, the Advocate claimed that Calhoun would be 
the heir to Jackson "if he proves faithful, worthy, and 
qualified."S The editors did not go so far as to adopt the 
doctrine of nullification because of this rationalization: 
After all, if properly considered apart from 
all prejudices, the doctrine of nullification 
... is not so very objectionable .... Call it 
nullification, constitutional resistance, or 
revolution, there is a right somewhere to remedy 
the evil and to redress the grievance. That 
right we think undoubtedly belongs to the people, 
and can only be expressed through convention .... 
If nullification means the right of a single 
state to judge the constitutionality of a law, 
and put its veto thereon without a resort to the 
final appealing tribunal (which we conceive to 
be a convention of the people, and not the 
Supreme Court of the United States) then we 
object to it as altogether indefensible. 
However unjust, unequal, and oppressive 
we may regard the Tariff, that 'bill of 
abominations,' we have always thought it not 
strictly speaking unconstitutional. It is 
drawing a rather nice distinction to say a tax 
for revenue is constitutional, and one for 
protection, not so.6 
According to their definition of nullification, the editors 
of the Advocate were not nullifiers -- yet. But not all 
held their narrow view of nullification. 
It was not until the 13th of August 1831 that Calhoun's 
public announcement acknowledging himself as the author of 
the South Carolina Exposition and Protest reached North 
Carolina papers. In Rutherfordton, the Western Advertiser 
praised the "bold and able reasoning" of the document.? The 
Fayetteville Observer also admired Calhoun's intellectual 
prowess but lamented that this event probably marked the end 
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of his hopes for the presidency. A week later, the Observer 
backtracked, stating that "it would be a singular 
coincidence, if Mr. Calhoun's Exposition should have the 
effect to place him in power and popularity" like the 
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions had done for Thomas 
Jefferson and James Madison. The Observer's editor, Edward 
J. Hale, went on to state that nullification was not a part 
of Calhoun's sentiments and that if the Exposition had come 
from Virginia, "it would doubtless[ly] be impossible to find 
anything amiss in it." Therefore, because "we think there 
is not just now any other individual combining all of the 
great requisites, so prominently before the public, as to 
ensure the defeat of both Jackson and Clay," the editor 
continued to give Calhoun his support for the 1832 
presidential election.8 The Advocate in Halifax concurred 
that Calhoun's doctrine was the same as Jefferson's and 
Madison's, and claimed that "Mr. Calhoun had thus built his 
faith upon a solid basis .... The foundation is of rock, and 
the principle he avows must be desirable and eternal as the 
existence of freedom and our free institutions."9 Thus, 
some of the pro-Calhoun papers in the state continued to 
support the South Carolinian, although most explicitly 
denied that his views were different from Jefferson's and 
Madison's or that his views were indeed that of 
nullification as popularly understood (probably because of 
the unpopularity of the doctrine with the people). 
The regular Democrat presses viewed Calhoun's 
publication with a somewhat different eye. The Raleigh 
Register printed all of Calhoun's letter except the 
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conclusion,which dismissed the tariff and was, therefore, 
the most potentially popular part to most anti-tariff North 
Carolinians. The editors, Joseph Gales and son, proclaimed 
that Calhoun's views were "too refined and sublimated for 
us," and that his ideals would shake the confidence of 
citizens not belonging to South Carolina's States Rights and 
Free Trade Party.lO The North Carolina Journal in 
Fayetteville was surprised by Calhoun's "coming out." It 
exclaimed, 
Public expectation has been on tiptoe for 
some weeks past, to see Mr. Calhoun's 
renunciation or disavowal of the doctrine of 
nullification .... Judge then our surprise 
upon opening a paper bearing his sign ... 
to find not only a frank avowal of the 
soundness of nullification principles, but a 
formal and elaborate argument in their defense. 
The editors added a note to Calhoun's letter, describing his 
"palpable sophisms" and the "loose texture of reasoning."ll 
Members of the National Republican faction throughout 
the state expressed their discontent with Calhoun as well. 
The New Bern Spectator raged against Calhoun by pointing out 
the "utter indefensibility" of the South Carolinian's 
argument that the states, not the people, were sovereign. 
John L. Pasteur, the editor, concluded that Calhoun's 
statement was fifty years late, that his ideas were 
applicable to the Articles of Confederation, not to the 
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present government.12 Judge William Gaston, an old 
Federalist superior court judge, felt that Calhoun had 
cornered himself by "having formed a party of zealous and 
devoted nullifiers" and thus had to come out with a 
"doctrine which holds such glaring and practical 
absurdities." Gaston lamented: "What a pity that such a 
mind as his [Calhoun's] should be so warped from its 
rectitude by unholy passions."13 
So the reaction to Calhoun's pronouncement as the 
"Father of Nullification" struck North Carolinians 
powerfully. Those who were inclined to praise Calhoun did 
so on a theoretical basis. They applauded the high-minded 
Calhoun's reliance on the widely accepted theories of 
Madison and Jefferson in the Virginia and Kentucky 
Resolutions. Thus, they found Calhoun's "states' rights" 
sentiments in keeping with the early republican principles 
of 1798. The Jacksonian Democrats refuted the Vice 
President. They saw Calhoun's machinations as a run for the 
presidency against their idol, Andrew Jackson. They 
disagreed with the "radical" nature of Calhoun's states' 
rights, which held the federal government to a strict 
interpretation of the constitution and affirmed the precepts 
of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, but remained 
steadfast to the states' rights' doctrines of Andrew 
Jackson, who had at times wavered in his Jeffersonian 
principles in areas like internal improvements and the 
tariff. Finally, the National Republican bloc disagreed 
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with the letter and intent of Calhoun's doctrine, although 
they dared not attack the theories behind it. As supporters 
of Henry Clay's American System, they recognized the 
explicit threat that South Carolina nullifiers posed to the 
tariff. Gaston pointed out that nullification was not 
"practical," which was probably correct, but did not attack 
its theoretical basis. For the political ambitions of the 
National Republican faction, to attack the "Principles of 
'98" would be a disastrous move in popular politics. By 
September 1831, then, the controversy-surrounding 
nullification and the tariff that was the immediate cause of 
nullification was in North Carolina entwined with the corning 
presidential election of 1832. 
Until the end of the year, nullification as an issue 
died down and the tariff issue took its place in the 
forefront of discussion in North Carolina. In October, the 
Rutherfordton Western Advertiser printed a letter from a 
citizen in Spartanburgh that recounted the reaction of a 
group of "Nullies" to the passing in a town meeting of 
resolutions against nullification. The nullifiers 
reportedly "retired from the scene of action with the 
comfortable assurance that the doctrine supported by them so 
zealously, meets with nothing but conternpt."15 On the other 
side of the state in New Bern, the Spectator took one last 
shot at Calhoun and the nullifiers. The editor of that 
paper saw more dangers in nullification than in the "old 
phantom of federalisrn."15 
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In September, an anti-tariff convention was proposed to 
be held the next month in Faye~teville. The Fayetteville 
Journal urged members who were to attend to debate the 
tariff only, "carefully abstaining from the introduction of 
any political matters" that may disturb the "force and 
unanimity" of the meeting.16 This almost certainly involved 
nullification. The Spectator justified the tariff as it 
existed in the United States at that time. The editors 
quoted Jefferson's speech to the House of Representatives in 
1793 in which he advocated a protective tariff. John 
Pasteur, the editor, hoped that this would have weight with 
those "who pretend to belong to the Jefferson school of 
politics."17 
By November, upon the meeting of the state legislature, 
it was decided that the tariff situation had not yet 
warranted North Carolina following South Carolina's threat 
of nullification with one of its own. North Carolina 
governor Montfort Stokes urged the legislature not to follow 
the lead of South Carolina, because he did not think that 
the people of North Carolina would be behind the move.18 
On the national scene, important national figures from 
North Carolina were warned about the importance of the 
upcoming congressional wars over the revision of the tariff 
in 1832. Willie Mangum, the North Carolina Senator from Red 
Mountain, was told by a prominent lawyer and state 
politician from Hillsboro, John Scott, that North Carolina 
"will sustain you under any responsibility you may encounter 
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with a view to adjust the Tariff Question." Scott assured 
Mangum that there was a feeling "of the deepest horror" at 
the idea of the destruction of the Union popularly seen as 
nullification.19 
From January to March 1832, the debates in Congress 
over the new tariff bill dominated North Carolina's 
political life. During this debate, almost all North 
Carolina Congressmen and Senators participated, and 
apparently the people and presses of the state heartily 
approved of their speeches and votes. In the Senate, Willie 
Mangum and Bedford Brown both gave major speeches in favor 
of modifying or eliminating the tariff. Likewise in the 
House, John Branch, Samuel Carson, Thomas H. Hall, and Jesse 
Speight all vocally opposed the tariff. 
During the debates on the Tariff of 1832, the House of 
Representatives underwent such long, gruelling sessions that 
the official transcriber often attested to the passing of 
eleven or twelve hour days. Surely for those legislators 
involved, the debates must have seemed even longer. On 23 
January, North Carolina House member Jesse Speight, a long-
time House Democrat from Stantonsburg, arose to complain 
that the tariff bill, instead of being sent to the Committee 
on Ways and Means, which controlled the revenue of the 
country, was sent to the Committee on Manufactures. This 
seemed to give an unfair advantage to northern 
manufacturers. Speight, part of the Branch faction of 
ardent states' rights Democrats at this time (he later 
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switched to being a regular Jacksonian because he did not 
like being labelled a "nullifier" as one of the Branch 
group), complained for the entire South, saying: 
when the planters of the South are down, 
and the Manufacturer of the North has 
his foot upon their necks, and his hand 
in their pocket ... Must the complaints 
of the oppressed be sent to a committee 
avowedly in favor of the policy that 
oppressed them?20 
Samuel Carson, another member of the Branch group from 
Pleasant Garden, added his condemnation of northern 
politicians by observing that "they seem to think it 
patriotic to drain away money from one part of the country 
to pour it into the pockets of another."21 John Branch 
believed that the tariff was designed to strip the South of 
its wealth, "day by day," and that eventually that section 
would either "sink into ruin" or "be compelled to take a 
step he shuddered to think of" -- disunion.22 
Yet North Carolina congressmen were not inflexible. 
They ernestly sought to reach a modification, not an 
absolute recall, of the tariff. Samuel Carson even voted 
for a tariff on iron implements, because it would help the 
farming interests. He saw this vote as a test of the 
northern manufacturers; were they taxing for the sake of 
protection or to line their own pockets and rob the South?23 
Thomas H. Hall, a Jackson Democrat from Tarboro, justified 
his votes for the tariff by stating that he had voted for 
any measure to reduce the present tariff rates, but 
reaffirmed that "he had never in his life given a tariff 
vote; he never should."24 
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Prior to Willie P. Mangum's speech against the tariff 
in the Senate on February 7, 1832, he had been advised by 
John Scott to work to modify the tariff. Priestly Mangum25, 
Willie's younger brother, cautioned that "now is not the 
time for the public servants of this State to speak of 
unconstitutional resistance," because "our people are ripe 
for no such thing." Priestly asserted that nothing short of 
"tangible oppression" would drive North Carolina out of the 
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Union.26 The elder Mangum was, however, pessimistic about 
the effectiveness of his upcoming speech. On the 25 January 
he wrote "The Senate will take an obstinate stand, I fear, 
against any substantial modification of the Tariff -- The 
worst possible spirit is indicated."27 
Mangum's actual speech in the Senate was a strongly 
worded diatribe against the evils of the protective system. 
He began by stating that the tariff was no longer a question 
of "political economy," but a question of liberty-- or the 
South's deprivation thereof. Mangum believed that the 
national tensions caused by the tariff had become so acute 
that the tariff question had become the most important 
problem considered by any "deliberative assembly" in 
American History, "with the exception of the Declaration of 
Independence."28 
Mangum's argument against the tariff was well thought 
out and represented the feelings of many throughout the 
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South. Mangum traced the tariff controversy back to the 
Embargo of 1807, when the states gave the federal government 
the right to lay duties and regulate foreign commerce. But 
the two were not necessarily connected, and the states did 
not entirely give up their right to regulate and protect 
their industry. Quoting The Federalist Papers, Mangum 
asserted that the powers delegated to the states were 
clearly defined during the Constitutional Convention. By 
giving inventors the sole right to their inventions for a 
specified period of time, the framers of the Constitution 
gave "a decisive expression of the sense of the convention 
against conferring on Congress the power to give 
manufacturers any other encouragement" than they might 
receive from a system of revenue duties. The states, 
furthermore, were given the rights, in Article 1, Section 10 
of the constitution, to lay duties on imports for revenue 
without consent of Congress; and with the consent of 
Congress, the states could establish protective duties. If 
Congress was to assume this power, then why was it 
originally retained for the states? According to Mangum, 
there was no reason except the greed of northern 
interests.29 
Mangum next accused northern manufacturers of having a 
vested interest in the tariff law. The first protective 
duties, according to the North Carolinian, ranged from 5 to 
15 percent ad velorum to protect infant industries. The 
only legitimate federal tariff was to raise revenue and to 
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counteract other nations' policies. If that was how the 
system was set up, then why forty years later were 
manufacturers asking for 40 to 250 percent protection? 
Mangum claimed that the system, as it had been perverted 
from its constitutional roots, was "flagrantly unjust." It 
was, he said: 
built up by selfish interests, associated 
together for selfish purposes, with no 
principle of cohesion but a mean, base 
passion for money .... Sir, it is money--
nothing but money -- and money extracted from 
others ... that holds together this system. 
These bandit interests have been rallied to 
its support by a thirst for rapine and they 
battle in its defense, with a vigor 
proportioned to the magnitude and enormity 
of its exactions.30 
Mangum also felt that it was not the people of the 
North, but the politicians and manufacturers who maintained 
the tariff system. The only way the people supported the 
system was by ignorance, and if honestly put before them, 
"Would they not, with honest indignation, hurl from their 
high places all the functionaries of this Government who had 
dared to participate in a scheme of such outrageous 
oppression?" Additionally, Mangum appealed to the ideals of 
Jefferson when he cried, "Agriculture, the great paramount 
interest, is taxed to exhaustion; he who toils in the earth, 
and he who plows the main, are plundered under the color of 
law of their legitimate profits to sustain a band of 
monopolists."31 
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The real reason behind the tariff uproar was clear-cut 
to Mangum. The prospect of ending the debt compiled in the 
Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the purchase of the 
Louisiana and Florida territories would deprive the North of 
millions of southern dollars. When the federal government 
took over the states' debts from the Revolution, it issued 
notes to private investors, who were paid interest. These 
notes accumulated in the North, because southerners sold 
theirs to obtain cash to buy land and slaves, which were 
more profitable than the interest rates on the notes. Then 
southern agriculture was taxed disproportionately, depriving 
farmers of their profits and providing the federal 
government money to pay northern note holders' interest. 
Thus, in Mangum's reasoning, the specter of ending the 
national debt meant that the North would lose "ten to twelve 
millions of dollars" annually. More importantly, this would 
be millions of dollars that would remain in the South.32 
Mangum ended his speech with a point that should have 
given the staunchest nullifier heart in the possibility of 
converting the North Carolina Senator to their cause. 
Mangum observed: 
To a superficial observer, ours seems to be, 
in fact, what it is in theory, a Government 
of the many for the benefit of the many. A 
closer investigation discloses the truth, 
that it is, practically, a Government of the 
smallest possible majority over the largest 
possible minority ... and that this majority 
... is, in fact, wielded by a combination of 
monopolists, capitalists, and adventuring 
politicians, who divide among themselves the 
richest spoils of their triumphs, and throw 
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but a crumb ... to the mere serfs of the party. 
Besides the obvious bitterness that Mangum expressed for the 
South as a part of the "largest possible minority," he also 
expressed more than idle bitterness when closing: "Sir, I 
feel a deep conviction that this system and this Union 
cannot exist permanently together."33 
Regular Democrat Bedford Brown, the other North 
Carolina Senator, followed Mangum in condemning the tariff. 
On March 30, 1832, Brown confirmed that "the principle of 
protection, as practiced by [the] government, he sincerely 
believed unconstitutional." Further, Brown threw even more 
serious charges at his peers; "this, or any other 
Government, which exerted its authority to take from one 
class of citizens the profits of their labor to bestow them 
on another class," was "essentially despotic."34 But Brown 
was perhaps less emotional and more penetrating in his 
analysis of the situation than Mangum. He realized that 
Henry Clay did not really believe that a reduction in the 
tariff would doom the entire protective system and the 
manufacturing base of the country. This was the voice of an 
alarmist. Brown "did not wish to see the manufacturing 
establishments of [the] country destroyed," but he was 
"unwilling that they should be sustained by the destruction 
of other great interests."35 
Yet some in North Carolina were still worried about the 
state's relationship with nullification and the tariff. 
Robert Gilliam, an attorney from Oxford, wrote, "I feel well 
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satisfied, that if a bill, based upon the principle of Mr. 
Clay's resolutions ... becomes the law of the land, that 
nullification ... will become the order of the day."36 The 
New Bern Carolina Sentinel threatened: "Let the execrations 
of posterity rest on the heads of those who by persevering 
in a system of injustice and oppression, would drive the 
South to resistance."37 Asa Biggs, a prominent Democrat, 
met with Willie Mangum in early April and carne away with the 
impression that Mangum was despairing over obtaining any 
relief from "colonial vassalage ... more intolerable than 
the causes that led to our Revolution."38 By the end of 
May, however, Mangum had seen enough of the debate to write 
that the tariff would be modified enough to "tranquilize, to 
a great extent, the excitement existing in the South."39 
North Carolina's congressional delegation split its 
vote evenly on the final vote on the Tariff of 1832 (see 
Figure 2). The Branch faction of Willie Mangum, Abraham 
Rencher, Samuel Carson, and John Branch all voted against 
the measure. They were joined by Jacksonians Thomas H. Hall 
and Bedford Brown. Those who voted against the tariff 
generally felt that it had not been reduced enough; some 
only considered complete repeal as acceptable. Seven others 
voted for the tariff: Augustine Shepperd, William Shepard, 
and Daniel Barringer were Independents, while Lauchlin 
Bethune, Henry Connor, Micajah Hawkins, and James McKay were 
Jackson Democrats. Jesse Speight, part of the Branch group, 
Senator Willie P. Mansum - Nay 
Senator Bedford Brown - Nay 
Figure 2. North Carolina Votes on the Tariff of 1832. 
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broke ranks and voted for the tariff, while Lewis Williams, 
an Independent, did not vote (see map).40 
The vote for the Tariff of 1832 left many Congressmen 
in the unenviable position of voting for a tariff bill, but 
being against the tariff in principle. Jesse Speight was 
one of those who felt the potential for confusion among his 
constituents. He explained, "If I am asked for my reasons 
for voting for this bill, I answer that it affords a 
reduction of from five to ten millions of dollars of taxes, 
and as it affords some relief to the people" Speight 
considered "half a loaf better than no bread." He did not 
believe that the time had come for the South to take "that 
stand which is the only alternative of an oppressed people." 
He voted for the Tariff of 1832, because it was an 
improvement over the "Tariff of Abominations," and "in the 
hope of preserving the Union a little longer."41 Bedford 
Brown determined to vote for the tariff bill as it emerged 
from the House of Representatives for the same reasons. But 
the Senate had amended the bill to the extent that Brown 
considered the tariff as a re-enactment of the unpopular 
Tariff of 1828.42 He voted no. Mangum distanced himself 
and the state from the whole thing. The Congressional 
Debates record "He [Mangum] repudiated, for himself and his 
constituents, any thing in common with the American system, 
which originated in cupidity."43 
The reaction in the state's press was not critical of 
the congressmen, although dissatisfaction with the tariff in 
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general still abounded. Thomas Watson, editor of the pro-
Jackson New Bern Sentinel, wrote that the tariff vote left 
the South with no choices. "Let a convention of the 
Southern States be called," he cried, to "offer to the North 
the terms upon which they are willing to remain in the 
Union." Yet the Sentinel denounced nullification and 
expressed hope that South Carolina would not put it into 
effect.44 As was the typical North Carolina reaction to the 
times, threats were made, but no lines drawn in the sand. 
The other paper in town, the pro-National Republican 
Spectator, also reacted along factional lines. Its editor, 
John Pasteur, expressed satisfaction with the vote, writing 
"the Bill is such a one as must satisfy every reasonable man 
for the present." As for the nullifiers, he wrote, "rave as 
they may, [they] will find it difficult to stir the people 
up to rebellion."45 
Only around Halifax, in an area of the state notable 
only for counties with higher numbers of blacks than whites, 
did nullification seem to have grassroots support. On 
January 26, the Roanoke Advocate printed the first letter 
written to the editor by "A Nullifier." The reader claimed 
that "every States Rights man is, in principle, a nullifier" 
because there was no middle ground between consolidation and 
nullification. "A Nullifier" pointed out that those who 
opposed nullification did so because they felt that the 
tariff was constitutional. If the tariff was 
constitutional, although oppressive to certain areas, then 
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nullifiers would necessarily be rebels if they resisted the 
law. On the other hand, if the tariff was not 
constitutional, then nullifiers were not rebels, but the 
keepers of real republican values. Furthermore, only a 
convention of the states could determine the 
constitutionality of the tariff, because the Supreme Court, 
as a member of the same government as Congress, was an 
"incompetent tribunal."46 
On the 9 February, "A Friend of Old Hickory" tried to 
divert the nullificationist bent of the Advocate by writing 
an essay promoting the value of the Union and concluding 
that "in the end it [nullification] will lead to 
disunion."47 But "A Nullifier" seemed to carry the day. On 
March 1, he had become more aggressive: 
If the present Congress does not take off all 
protecting duties, and make the whole revenue 
law uniform, I will recommend to this state, 
that a convention be convened, the duty of which 
shall be, to declare the whole law null and 
inoperative.48 
After this essay was published, the editors of the 
Advocate became more and more openly pro-nullificationist, 
going beyond the strict states' rights stand that they had 
earlier taken. For three sucessive weeks, from July 26 to 
August 9, the Advocate was the forum for "Sydney," an 
outspoken nullificationist. "Sydney" claimed that 
"Nullification is not the monster its enemies would make it 
--it is not sedition-- it is not disunion." Nullification 
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was likened to the medical practitioners of the day: "It is 
the mild and gentle means of the humane physician, and not 
the rough operation of the unfeeling surgeon."49 "Sydney'' 
did not advocate secession, but felt, like Calhoun, that 
nullification was a means of preserving the Union.SO On the 
17th of September, the editors of the Advocate lamented that 
the people as a whole had not come to a decision on 
nullification -- few understood it but many denounced it 
in their ignorance while paradoxically asserting that a 
state could declare a law unconstitutional. "But in 
denouncing Nullification," warned the editors, "let the 
people beware, lest they fall into Consolidation."51 
The Branch press was caught in a difficult dilemma by 
the entire nullification controversy. They were somewhat 
typical of North Carolina as a state, in that they were more 
states' rightist in their constitutional beliefs than the 
regular Democrats, yet they refused to give their support to 
nullification. During the crisis they were often accused of 
being nullifiers, but they never adopted that position 
officially. As one author has noted, not all of the Branch 
group were nullifiers, but all of the nullifiers were a part 
of the Branch group.52 If this relationship seems 
complicated today, at the time keeping the doctrines 
straight must have been enormously frustrating. In 
Fayetteville, the Carolina Observer was one of the most 
vocal Branch presses in the state. On May 29, 1832, Edward 
Hale, the editor of that paper, faced a serious challenge 
43 
from a letter written by "Cape Fear." "Cape Fear" 
reminisced back to the previous year and Calhoun's letter on 
nullification. The writer recalled that "I could not 
reconcile the theory of Nullification to myself, and from a 
garbled, but imperfect knowledge of the principle, I 
considered it alarmingly dangerous." When in the late 
spring of 1832 a copy of the "newly discovered" Virginia and 
Kentucky Resolutions was placed in his hand, "Cape Fear" 
felt "convicted of moral ignorance as well as moral 
indignity to the Honorable John C. Calhoun." He continued: 
I now believe that that philosophical veil ... 
is satisfactorily raised from my vision, and 
that the purity of his [Calhoun's] patriotism 
is now unfurled in radiant splendor! Who can 
read those resolutions and compare the same 
with Calhoun's address and say that he is only 
seeking to build up for himself, a political 
fabric for unwise and corrupt purposes? What 
higher authority would any man require (hungry 
partisans excepted) than the index of Thomas 
Jefferson, and who better knew the true spirit 
of the constitution was perverted, than he whom 
(we all believe) draughted that instrument?53 
That Hale felt keenly the threat of "Cape Fear" is evident 
in his unusual (in not keeping with factional lines) praise 
for the speech of William Gaston, an old Federalist who was 
a hero of the National Republican Party, and his comment 
that "we can not shut our eyes to the rapid strides that the 
doctrine of Nullification is making in our own State."54 
The editor of the Observer defended himself from the 
negative remarks made about nullification and the Branch 
faction by regular Democrats and National Republicans alike. 
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The Observer continued to support Calhoun for the presidency 
in August 1832 and regarded his letter of July 1831 as 
"setting forth the Southern or Virginia doctrine of States 
Rights, not the South Carolina doctrine of Nullification."55 
This assertion apparently did not set well with the paper's 
readers. A letter from "Union" condemned the aspirations of 
the States Rights and Free Trade Party in South Carolina and 
"the maddened politicians" of that state.56 "Cumberland" 
wrote that "The advocates of Nullification are not the 
friends of liberty -- they are its enemies -- they are 
either ambitious demagogues or blind head-strong 
partisans."57 By the November polling date, Hale could 
proclaim, if not triumphantly, then resolutely, "There is 
but little Nullification in North Carolina."58 What 
remained to be reconciled was the relationship that the 
editor perceived existed between Calhoun and the doctrine. 
The National Republican press criticized nullification 
throughout 1832. In April the New Bern Spectator addressed 
the new rage in the nullification debate. The Virginia and 
Kentucky Resolutions had long been attributed to James 
Madison and Thomas Jefferson, but no draft in their 
handwritings had ever been found. When a copy of the 
Resolutions was found in Jefferson's notes, nullifiers 
seemingly gained a very powerful sponsor. The Spectator 
acknowledged that Jefferson may have written the Kentucky 
Resolutions but reminded the nullifiers that they had no 
reason to rejoice. The editor, John Pasteur, claimed: "We 
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have always considered an unqualified devotion to the 
opinions of any statesman ... as ... dangerous to the 
commonwealth."59 Jefferson was usually right and well 
respected by all, but this time, Pasteur declared, he was 
wrong. His true sentiments were not the radical states' 
rights' doctrines of '98, but were present in his inaugural 
address in 1801 when he said: "Absolute acquiescence in the 
decision of the majority is the vital principle of 
Republics."60 The Spectator suggested that instead of 
relying on the duplicitous Jefferson, the country should 
take George Washington's words to heart that the basis of 
the government was that the people have a right to amend the 
Constitution.61 Based upon these precepts, the editor 
"would voluntarily step forward to extort that respect for 
the Constitution which the hardihood of folly would deny."62 
The nullifiers of South Carolina were not patriots, as they 
claimed, but traitors.63 
The National Republican press often looked to the Old 
Federalist, William Gaston, for leadership and clear 
reasoning. In a widely reported speech to the graduating 
seniors of the University of North Carolina in June 1832, 
Gaston explained the dangers of disunion. "What can one 
[section] do without the other?" Gaston asked. The only 
results of disunion would be "They will present fields and 
occasions for border wars, leagues, and counter leagues." 
Only the Constitution could save the country from a terrible 
fate.64 By the end of June, the editor of the Spectator 
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felt confident of the demise of nullification, calling its 
specter "amusingly ridiculous," and claiming that "There is 
glorious prospect ahead that Jacksonism and Nullification 
will sink together."65 
The Democratic press only grudgingly gave nullification 
precedent in the writings of Thomas Jefferson. While "the 
mantle of Jefferson" was thrown around the nullification 
doctrine by the discovery of the elusive manuscripts, the 
New Bern Carolina Sentinel hoped that its "chivalric 
brothers of the South" would refrain from implementing 
methods of recourse "so fraught with fearful consequences" 
as nullification.66 If they did opt for radical measures, 
though, the editors claimed that "North Carolina would be 
loth indeed to send a man or musket for her [South 
Carolina's) subjugation -- she would not -- No! she would 
not." Further, northern manufacturers were warned: "May 
the arm of him be palsied who would raise it against our 
brethren contending for their violated rights .... The 
manufacturers may jeer and gibe, but they should not 
pressure too far." The tariff, the Sentinel claimed, "is a 
system of plunder" and the manufacturing states "know it to 
be so." Finally, if the only recourse of the South, after 
four long years of oppression and argument for redress, was 
disunion, "let the curse of posterity rest on them, not on 
the heads of those who refused to submit to its withering 
influence."67 
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Another Democratic paper, the North Carolina Journal, 
published in Fayetteville, alsq distanced itself further 
from the radicals to the south. The Journal claimed that 
the reason for the confusion concerning states' rights, the 
Virginia and Kentucky Resolves, and nullification was that 
the nullifiers blended pure doctrines with those of their 
own "which are not so."68 The paper commented at length on 
the many meetings that occurred in the state in the fall of 
1832 -- meetings that most often resolved that the Union was 
uppermost in the minds of the citizens. North Carolina, the 
Journal claimed, would, 
resist these encroachments by means which are 
strictly constitutional, they will testify 
their disapprobation of these acts by an 
untiring resistance to them, they will exhaust 
all the means which reason and argument supply, 
ere they will resort to the dread alternative 
of force; nor will they resort to this, until 
their burdens become too heavy to be borne.69 
To the editors of the Journal, all arguments had not been 
exhausted, especially if one viewed the revisions in the 
tariff made by the Tariff Bill of 1832. And while Andrew 
Jackson was in the White House, the editors saw no reason 
for Democrats to fear. Old Hickory and "New York's gifted 
son" -- Martin Van Buren -- would avert the calamity of 
disunion.70 
As the presidential election of 1832 drew near, it was 
evident to all but the staunchest Clay supporters that there 
was very little pro-Clay sentiment in North Carolina. The 
48 
real battle lay not in the presidential election -- Jackson 
was locked in -- but in which ticket, Jackson-Van Buren or 
Jackson-Phillip Barbour (a Virginian seen as a "proper" 
states' rightists), would triumph.71 In North Carolina the 
Branch faction supported Jackson-Barbour, as did some of the 
regular Democrats. Most Democrats, and a vast majority of 
the people, voted for Jackson-Van Buren. Part of the 
"scare" against Van Buren's nomination (besides the fact 
that he was a Yankee) was the rumor, loudly developed by the 
Branch press and National Republicans, that Jackson's health 
had deteriorated seriously and the vice presidential 
appointment was, in fact, the appointment of Old Hickory's 
successor. James Iredell, Jr., one of the leaders of the 
Branch faction, predicted that "Van Buren cannot get the 
vote of North Carolina for Vice President."72 The Halifax 
Advocate joined the Branch group in denouncing Van Buren as 
"the author and founder" of the tariff.73 The Observer 
claimed that "the enemies of the Tariff in this State, are 
not to be bamboozled into the support of an avowed friend of 
the·system, by the bugbear of Nullification."74 The Branch 
group supported Phillip Barbour of Virginia as the preferred 
running mate for Andrew Jackson. Barbour was seen as from 
the "old school of '98" politicians, in favor of a strict 
interpretation of the Constitution and opposed to internal 
improvements and the Bank of the United States.75 
Some of the regular Democrat press, such as the New 
Bern Carolina Sentinel, also supported Barbour, although 
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most of this faction's presses supported Jackson and 
whomever he named as his running mate. The National 
Republican faction tried to turn the Van Buren question to 
its advantage. John Pasteur of the New Bern Spectator wrote 
that if North Carolinians did deign to vote for the New York 
politician, "then ... forever shut your mouths on the 
subject of the Tariff," and should Congress refuse to modify 
it, "no murmuring, no rebellion -- for what faith, what 
credit can Congress or anyone else place in your complaints, 
when they find you supporting the author of the Tariff?"76 
The paper then lashed out at enemies inside and outside the 
state, declaring: "It would moreover, prove a most unkind 
cut" to the nullifiers of South Carolina: "with what face 
could they pursue their favorite project of disunion, if 
their brethren ... by taking Van Buren by the hand, 
proclaimed to the world ... that their complaints and 
outcries were all a sham."77 
On the eve of the election the three factions stood 
like this: The regular Democrats supported Andrew Jackson. 
If he wanted a New Yorker, Martin Van Buren, as vice 
president, well, that was fine too. Jacksonians professed 
an affection for states' rights and despised Henry Clay and 
his American System of tariffs, federal banks, and federally 
funded internal improvements. Regular Democrats despised 
John C. Calhoun, because of what some saw as his impertinent 
actions by writing the South Carolina Exposition and Protest 
while vice president. Nullification, to Jacksonians, was 
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not a constitutional view of states' rights, but a dangerous 
theory that threatened civil war if implemented. 
The Branch coalition supported Jackson and Phillip 
Barbour, a southerner whom they felt exemplified better than 
Van Buren their states' rights ideal. This states' rights 
doctrine was based on the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. 
While this group never "officially" adopted nullification 
(this was too loose of a coalition to really have an 
official policy), they did support Calhoun and some of the 
group were nullifiers. Needless to say, Branchites loathed 
the tariff and all other aspects of the American System and 
its founder Henry Clay. 
The third faction was the National Republican bloc. 
This group consisted of anti-Jackson men who supported Clay 
and his principles to varying degrees. Some were more anti-
Jackson than they were pro-Clay, while others advocated the 
tariff, federally funded internal improvements, and 
especially the Bank of the United States. Politics did 
indeed make strange bedfellows when this group allied with 
the Branchites over the debunking of Martin Van Buren in the 
election of 1832. Nullification was, however, a double 
threat to these politicians. Besides threatening the Union, 
nullification struck at the very heart of the American 
System, the protective tariff. This faction unabidingly 
hated Calhoun and his followers. 
Thus was the sometimes confusing state of affairs in 
North Carolina at the beginning of the nullification crisis. 
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The events of the next five months, from November 1832 to 
March 1833, would force the state into a more concrete 
stance on the nullification issue. With South Carolina's 
Ordinance of Nullification a line would be drawn, and 
decisions would have to be made and adhered to by North 
Carolina's politicians. In light of the upcoming crisis, 
the rift between the Democrats and the Branch group widened 
because of enflamed passions, and the stands of the 
nullifiers and National Republicans became more intolerant. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE NULLIFICATION CRISIS IN NORTH CAROLINA 
"Beaven avert us from the horrors of civil war." 
Jesse Speight 
Almost immediately after the election of 1832, South 
Carolina posted its Ordinance of Nullification, targeting 
February 1, 1833 as the day it would go into effect. Then 
the Tariff of 1832 would be, in effect, null and void in 
South Carolina and the collection of duties in the state's 
ports prohibited. As the nullification crisis developed, 
the already factious nature of North Carolina politics 
underwent further upheaval. According to Richard Ellis, 
however, the threat of nullification did not pit nationalist 
against states' rightists. It was primarily a struggle 
between two groups of states' rightists. 
The unrest surrounding the nullification movement 
affected the three factions in North Carolina politics 
variously. The fragile Branch ring, held together in 1832 
only by opposition to Martin Van Buren, lost members because 
of the group's connections with John C. Calhoun. The 
National Republican bloc shifted from support of the 
Branchites against Van Buren to cooperation with the 
Jackson-Van Buren Democrats against the Branch forces. 
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Regular Democrats did not escape the divisiveness. When 
President Jackson asked Congre~s for the Force Bill to 
coerce South Carolina, destuction of states' rights as a 
doctrine stared the Democrats in the face. After the crisis 
ended, all three groups breathed a collective sigh of relief 
and went back to the regular routine. Deep rifts, however, 
had occurred. The differences of opinion evident during the 
nullification crisis started many of the state's most 
powerful politicians toward institutionalized protest of 
Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren with the formation of 
the Whig Party in the state in 1834. 
North Carolina's reaction to the Ordinance of 
Nullification was characteristic of the feelings of the 
state toward Andrew Jackson, states' rights, the tariff, and 
the doctrine of nullification itself. John Branch and the 
other hard core pro-Calhounists remained faithful to the 
South Carolinian and took a solid states' rights stand. 
Some of Branch's group were nullifiers. Others were 
secessionists. All of the faction agreed that the federal 
government did not have the right to subdue South Carolina 
militarily. In Fayetteville, the Carolina Observer 
proclaimed that many people, even the most ardent Unionists 
in the South, felt that the South Carolina Ordinance may 
have expressed the fact that there "may be found a limit to 
the patience of the whole South" over the tariff.l In the 
northeast part of the state, in the counties surrounding the 
Roanoke River, there seemed to be a greater proportion of 
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radical states' rightists and even nullifiers. Besides the 
presence of a black majority (and the corresponding increase 
in racial fears associated with the imbalence), the area 
around Halifax County had some of the more radical of the 
state's politicians such as John Branch, of Enfield, and 
John Randolph, the former Virginia congressman noted for the 
radicalness of his states' rights views. The States Rights 
Party of Halifax expressed its jubilation at the receipt of 
South Carolina's Ordinance by "firing of Cannon and other 
demonstrations of public joy."2 The Advocate proclaimed 
"the right of STATE INTERPOSITION [we] can never give up," 
and warned the federal government against the use of force 
in the crisis.3 
Other parts of the Branch faction that had united 
against the Jackson-Van Buren ticket in 1832 splintered off 
from the group over the radical doctrine of nullification. 
The New Bern Spectator made its anti-nullification 
sentiments clear from the beginning -- it refused to print 
the "treasonous and unprecedented effusion" of the 
Ordinance. Furthermore, the editors, who were supporters of 
Henry Clay, were even willing to "rub off old scores" with 
Jackson if he squashed the South Carolina movement.4 Yet 
they feared that as "the President has always been 
confessedly latitudinarian in his loyal and constitutional 
opinions" the South Carolinians would presume that "he 
cannot consistently require a rigid conformity from them."5 
The Spectator speculated that the nullifiers would be no 
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better citizens if their grievances were removed, and urged 
all readers to attend the Union meeting on December 8, 1832 
in New Bern.6 
At that meeting, Judge William Gaston, the Old 
Federalist judge from New Bern, actively protested the 
Ordinance by resolving that the people condemn nullification 
as "inconsistent" with a ''just view of the rights and 
obligations of the State" and leading to a dissolution of 
the Union.? Apparently, many North Carolinians agreed with 
Gaston. In January, men and women continued to gather to 
declare their devotion to the Union either as political 
parties, towns, individuals, or in at least one case, as 
military companies. Some meetings denounced the tariff, 
South Carolina, or specifically John C. Calhoun, but most 
echoed Jackson's statement that the Union "must be 
preserved."8 
As the crisis evolved, fewer and fewer people 
throughout the state approved of the stand taken by South 
Carolina. Politicians who had been branded, justly or 
unjustly, as nullifiers sought to distance themselves from 
the doctrine (which was tricky to do and yet remain a 
states' rightist). Spivey McKissick noticed that Person 
County had "only one nullifier and he is trying to work out 
of his former opinion."9 Others recognized that states' 
rights and nullification were going to be hard to separate. 
William Polk, a regular Democrat, commented that "such is 
the fruits of the Jeffersonian doctrines of 1798" that that 
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"Hydra Democracy is about to devour all order here 
[Raleigh]." Polk looked to South Carolina as "proof 
positive" that the work of the Revolution was about to be 
broken and "the nation thrown into convulsion and misery 
under the government of small and impotent democracies."lO 
Old Hickory's reaction was of paramount importance to 
North Carolinians. In Jackson's annual message to the 
Twenty-second Congress, he seemed conciliatory and said 
little about the problems in South Carolina. This message 
contained nothing about using force to resist nullification. 
Furthermore, the president advocated tariff reductions. 
This message prompted mixed reactions in North Carolina: 
joy at the possible reduction of the tariff and anxiety 
about whether the president would take the necessary steps 
to "counteract the edict of nullification" and "maintain the 
supremacy of the laws of the Union."ll Both the Jackson-Van 
Buren and National Republican groups expressed their support 
of Jackson's message. The Jackson-Van Buren paper in 
Fayetteville, the North Carolina Journal, .declared that a 
policy of tariff reduction would avoid bloodshed while 
saving the Union.12 The National Republican press in New 
Bern urged Jackson to enforce the law and not trifle with 
nullification.13 
On December 10, 1832, Jackson explained how he would 
deal with South Carolina in his Nullification Proclamation. 
In what may very well have been the most complete and cogent 
explanation of Unionist sentiment yet produced by an 
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American statesman, Jackson strongly affirmed that the Union 
was perpetual. He also denied that a state had the right to 
secede, because that would destroy the nation. Finally, 
Jackson warned South Carolinians that nullification was 
treason and that he would unflinchingly enforce federal 
law.14 
In North Carolina, response to the Proclamation varied 
according to sentiments. The pro-National Republican 
Spectator, which had been Jackson's harshest critic a few 
weeks earlier, declared that the Proclamation was "the 
noblest document that ever bore the name of Andrew Jackson" 
and it did "more to immortalize his name than even the 
victory in New Orleans." Editors John Pasteur and his new 
partner, Robert G. Moore, appealed to South Carolinians to 
rescind the Ordinance. If they did not, the newspapermen 
threatened, North Carolina must view her southern neighbor 
as an enemy.15 Pasteur and Moore further assured 
northerners of their loyalty by proclaiming: "The Union, 
the whole Union, and nothing but the Union, is our 
watchword."l6 
Members of the Branch faction were less than thrilled 
about the Proclamation and its inherent rebuff of the 
doctrine of their brand of states' rights. The Star claimed 
that only tariff men and consolidationists could approve of 
the president's message.17 It also promoted the enlistment 
of "individuals, or by companies, troops, battalions, 
squadrons, or regiments of artillery, cavalry, or riflemen" 
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as volunteers for the South Carolina militia.18 John 
Bailey, an influential lawyer from Pasquotank County, stated 
that "if the principles contained in General Jackson's 
proclamation" were that of Congress, then "the days of our 
Republic are numbered."19 Willie Mangum, a part of the 
Branch group in spirit (and within two years a fellow member 
of the Whig Party), felt that the document was violent and 
dangerous in principle.20 Many saw the president's 
assertions as a threatening escalation toward civil war. 
The Carolina Observer stated its belief that the manner in 
which the laws were enforced in South Carolina would 
determine whether North Carolina would unite in support of 
the federal government. The editor, Edward Hale, trusted 
that "any unnecessary act of violence, any tyrannical act of 
oppression, would be apt to enlist North Carolina in the 
cause of her sister."21 
Jacksonian Democrats also saw danger to Jeffersonian 
principles in the president's message, but they realized 
that the gravity of the situation called for stringent 
measures. At this time, Jesse Speight abandoned the Branch 
coalition for the ranks of Jacksonians, declaiing that the 
people would "stand by Andrew Jackson and save the Union."22 
Thomas Hall, another Jacksonian North Carolina congressman, 
wrote to Van Buren that "I concur with you entirely with 
regard to what the president has done, and what he is 
desirous to do." Hall was confident that Jackson would 
return the government to its proper principles and felt that 
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it was his duty to help the president in his "great work" of 
saving the Union.23 
With the posting of the Ordinance of Nullification and 
the Nullification Proclamation, the lines were finally drawn 
in what had been an ongoing ideological debate between two 
factions of states' rightsists and Unionists. Both the 
regular Democrats and the Branch faction claimed the states' 
rights' tradition as their own. The upcoming crisis would 
help both groups define what had been an uncertain group of 
concepts: states' rights, Union, secession, nullification, 
and consolidation. Because of South Carolina's attempt to 
nullify the Tariff of 1832, North Carolinians were forced to 
make a decision on states' rights and stand either on the 
side of state sovereignty or the Union. 
When the state legislature, consisting of ninety 
regular Democrats, fifty-five Branch men, and ten National 
Republicans, convened, the legislators realized that they 
were in a precarious position.24 If they took a stand 
against the use of coercion by the federal government, they 
would make it harder for force to be used against South 
Carolina. At the same time, North Carolinians felt that if 
they gave South Carolina any encouragement at all, 
nullification would go into effect and the Union would be 
shattered. 
As the legislature moved its first orders of business 
and elected the unheralded David L. Swain as the new 
governor, the retiring governor, Montfort Stokes, addressed 
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his farewell speech to the new state government. Stokes 
commented on the difficulties threatening "the peace and 
harmony" of the nation and warned that persistence by "an 
excited portion of the Southern people" in their present 
course would "weaken the ties which have heretofore so 
happily united us together as a nation." He also praised 
North Carolinians for avoiding "any interference calculated 
to disturb the public tranquility" and urged that the people 
of the South not force upon the United States "hazardous 
experiments to change the terms of that connection" between 
the states. In his devotion to the Union, Stokes felt that 
he reflected the feelings of most of the people in North 
Carolina. They did not approve of states nullifying federal 
laws; they did not approve of federal troops being used to 
coerce a state (especially to enforce an unjust law like the 
tariff); and above all, they wanted to "cling to the Union 
of states as now connected."25 
With the departing governor's speech, the debate on 
nullification and North Carolina's response to South 
Carolina's stand began. On November 22, 1832, Robert 
Martin, a part of the National Republican faction from 
Rockingham, introduced a resolution designed to show both 
South Carolina and the federal government the views of his 
state. His resolution affirmed a "sacred attachment to the 
Constitution" and urged that the people "deprecate the 
doctrine of Nullification."26 Martin proclaimed faith in 
the wisdom and integrity of the federal government. But due 
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to the "excitement and sectional feeling, which already 
pervades the country to a fearful extent," condemned the 
idea of a southern convention to discuss the tariff.27 On 
the 24th, Walter F. Leake, a Jackson-Van Buren man from 
Richmond County, introduced a similar set of resolutions. 
Leake stressed the nature of the controversy in his preamble 
and asserted that while not in favor of nullification, "we 
are nevertheless alive to the cause which has given rise to 
it."28 Leake also proclaimed that the powers ceded by the 
states to the national government, "were delegated in trust 
for the accomplishment of certain limited and defined 
objects" which did not include protection of 
manufacturers.29 In fact, in Leake's mind, the tariff was 
more easily proven unconstitutional than the concept of 
nullification. He said that, "sooner than live in a 
government of unlimited powers, I would take Nullification, 
with all its attendants of revolution, internal commotion, 
and civil war." Leake continued, stating "that a State, has 
the right, in extreme cases to secede, I cannot believe 
otherwise."30 
These resolutions were not entirely satisfactory to 
most of the legislators. They did not show the feelings of 
North Carolina toward the tariff, South Carolina, 
nullification, and the Union coherently enough. Although 
they did capture some of the important feelings of the 
people, there was more involved. In the House of Commons, a 
motion was made to adopt a set of resolutions with a 
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slightly different emphasis. Archibald Monk from Sampson 
County introduced a set of resolutions that acknowledged 
that the construction of the Constitution on matters such as 
internal improvements, the bank,·money appropriations, 
public lands, and tariffs was open to differing 
interpretations. Because of this, although Congress had 
passed laws concerning these issues "believing them to be in 
conformity with the true spirit and meaning of the 
Constitution," the nation was about to be split apart. So, 
"whereas many of the good citizens of this State do believe 
and entertain the opinion that there is no tribunal which 
can amicably and satisfactorily decide and adjust the 
foregoing contested articles," North Carolina's delegation 
to Congress was to be instructed to request a convention of 
all of the states to interpret the Constitution and "save 
the Union from anarchy." John Daniel from Halifax, added 
resolutions stating explicitly that the protective tariff 
was unconstitutional and unjust and that it "tended to 
weaken the union of these states by impairing the confidence 
of a large portion of the southern people in the justice of 
the General Government." Daniel pledged support to the 
tariff of 1832, despite the "painful anxiety and opposition" 
of the protectionists and asserted that "we have not yet 
lost all confidence in the justice of the General 
Government." His resolutions stated that "we sympathize 
with the people of South Carolina," but not in the theory of 
nullification.31 
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Samuel T. Sawyer, a nullifier from Edenton, was even 
more outspoken in his states' rights' leanings. He 
introduced resolutions in the House of Commons declaring 
that the states "are not united on the principle of 
unlimited submission to the General Government" but by a 
government of "special purposes" and of "certain definite 
powers." Further, to combat the rise to overbearing power 
of the government over the limitations imposed by the 
Constitution, a right of "nullification by those 
sovereignties [states] of unauthorized acts ... is the 
rightful remedy." Sawyer continued on this tack by stating 
that the state of North Carolina considered the tariff laws 
"palpable violations of the said Constitution," ~nd that 
silence by the state would be acquiescence to oppression and 
domination of the states by the federal government. The 
state did not recognize the right of any authority "to 
appeal to the sword as an arbiter to settle such 
controversy" nor to the "arms of the U.S." to restrain any 
state "from the exercise of those legitimate powers which 
belong to her sovereign character [secession]." Finally, 
Sawyer's resolutions said that the state of North Carolina, 
not recognizing the right of the federal government to use 
force to keep a state in the Union, "will not tamely submit 
to the exercise of military coercion ... against her sister 
state."32 
The Jacksonians attacked the South Carolina Ordinance 
along different lines than did the National Republican 
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faction. They struck at the tariff. Richard Dobbs Spaight 
of New Bern, one of the leaders of the regular Democrats, 
proposed a preamble and resolution that stated that the 
national debt would be retired in 1833 and there were 
sufficient funds in the treasury to pay it. Therefore, on 
the president's recommendation, Congress would reduce the 
tariff "to a plain and economical system of revenue." If 
Congress did not, Spaight believed the president would 
himself end the tariff. This being the case, Spaight 
resolved that South Carolina be requested to suspend the 
Ordinance of Nullification until September 1, 1833 to give 
Congress and the president time to act.33 
Thus, there were five distinct proposals for ending the 
crisis. Martin's condemned both nullification and the idea 
of a southern convention. Leake's declared both 
nullification and the tariff unconstitutional. Archibald 
Monk pined for a convention of all the states to determine 
the constitutionality of the issue and, coupled with 
Daniel's resolutions, condemned the tariff and sympathized 
with South Carolina. Sawyer, the outspoken nullifier, 
stated that nullification was the correct remedy for a state 
to adopt when a federal law was oppressive and declared that 
secession was a constitutional right of a "sovereign" state. 
Spaight placed complete faith in Jackson to either persuade 
Congress to end the protective tariff, or to do it himself. 
As resolution after resolution was presented, the 
legislators decided to create a joint select committee to 
draw up a single set of declarations that all could agree 
upon. 
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In late December 1832, the committee, headed by John D. 
Toomer of Fayetteville, reported to the Senate for the first 
time. Toomer drew up a new set of resolutions, which stated 
that the people of North Carolina "doth unequivocally 
express a warm attachment to the constitution." Second, 
they declared a devoted bond with the Union. Third, the 
resolutions affirmed the belief that the people of the state 
felt that the tariff was "unconstitutional ... impolitic, 
unjust, and oppressive." Fourth, Toomer's resolutions 
asserted that the doctrine of nullification was subversive 
to the Constitution. Finally, the statement instructed the 
state's congressional delegation to work to defuse the 
situation between South Carolina and the federal 
government.34 
Five days later, the legislature discussed and amended 
Toomer's resolutions. In the Senate, Louis Wilson of 
Edgecomb proposed to add a call for a convention of states 
to amend the Constitution with more precise wording 
"restraining and restricting the powers of Cotigress." The 
vote on this motion was evenly split, twenty-eight to 
twenty-eight, with the Speaker, William Mosely, a regular 
Democrat, casting the deciding vote for the pro-states' 
rights motion in the affirmative.35 
William Hall, of Brunswick, moved to amend the 
resolution further by striking out the third resolution and 
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substituting a much more aggressive condemnation of the 
tariff (by the legislature instead of by the people of the 
state). Hall's substitution was voted down.36 Next, the 
Toomer report, with Wilson's amendment, was broken down and 
voted on by individual sections by the Senate. The first 
two resolutions expressing attachment to the Constitution 
and the Union, passed unanimously. The third, dealing with 
the tariff, passed by a voted of fifty-one to three. The 
fourth, regarding nullification, was adopted by a vote of 
forty-nine to nine (see Figure 3), and the fifth (added by 
Wilson) was rejected, twenty-seven to thirty. Finally, the 
sixth and seventh resolutions, to send instructions to the 
Congressmen and to print and send the resolutions to the 
governor of South Carolina and the president, passed fifty-
eight to zero. Spaight's resolution was passed by a vote of 
fifty ayes against three nays. This measure provided that a 
separate letter to be sent from Governor Swain to the 
governor of South Carolina urging the withdrawal of the 
Ordinance of Nullification until Congress had time to reform 
the tariff.37 
In the House of Commons, legislators tried to amend the 
resolutions to reflect a stronger states' rights bias. When 
votes were taken on the Toomer resolutions individually, the 
first was passed unanimously. The second also was affirmed. 
John Bragg of Warren County moved to strike out the third 
resolution and replace it with a broader condemnation of the 
tariff and call for its speedy repeal, but the House voted 
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thirty~six to eighty-four to keep the original wording. 
Bragg next sought to strike out the fourth resolution and 
replace it with one that expressed sympathy for South 
Carolina and stated that "not considering the existing 
grievances great ... (and] intolerable as to justify a 
resort to any extreme and extraconstitutional remedy for 
relief," nullification was, at this time, unnecessary. 
Bragg's motion was once again voted down. The next day, 
Spencer O'Brien tried again to strike the fourth resolution 
and add one more sympathetic to South Carolina. The movement 
failed again, this time by a vote of thirty to ninety. 
Another motion to replace the fourth resolution with a more 
pacifistic message to South Carolina was defeated and the 
original wording of the fourth provision finally passed, 
ninety-eight to twenty-two (see Figure 4).38 
Once the debate on the resolution concerning 
nullification subsided, the House finished its voting. The 
fifth resolution was passed by the House in a vote of 111 to 
1.39 Henry Clark of Beaufort alone voted against the 
measure because he felt that the state legislature had no 
grounds to instruct congressmen or senators.40 Joseph 
Townsend introduced a motion to "protest against the use of 
force by the General Government against the State of South 
Carolina" but it was rejected eighteen to eighty-two.41 The 
last resolution was read and adopted, and the resolutions 
were ordered to be sent back to the Senate.42 
Me con 
Fi~ure 3. Nay VotPs on the Passage of the Fourth 
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Once back in the Senate, there was one final motion to 
amend the resolutions before the Toomer committee submitted 
its final report. Dr. John Potts, a regular Democrat from 
Edgecomb County, asked that the Senate adopt a resolution 
declaring that North Carolina "deprecates the resort to 
force, either by the General Government or the State of 
South Carolina." This motion was tabled.43 On the 7th of 
January, the joint committee headed by Toomer submitted its 
final draft of the message to be sent to South Carolina and 
the president. Toomer emphasized that "the people of this 
State are ardently attached to the Constitution and 
sincerely devoted to the Union." But he also affirmed "the 
right of the oppressed to break asunder the ties which 
connect them to the oppressor." The committee was aware of 
the gravity of secession, seeing that it would "be 
accompanied by deeds of violence and scenes of blood" in 
civil war. They declared that the tariff was 
unconstitutional and thus urged a constitutional convention. 
The committee asserted that nullification was "revolutionary 
in character" and "subversive of the Constitution and leads 
to a dissolution of the Union." South Caroliria's attitude 
filled the members "with the deepest solicitude and the most 
heart thrilling anxiety," because North Carolina was 
implicated in the existing controversy by being on the 
border of what could become a battleground. South Carolina 
was supplicated to refrain from pursuing its course by the 
outstretching of the "olive branch of peace, and with the 
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offerings of conciliation in our hearts."44 Despite the 
heavy states' rights rhetoric, North Carolina politicians 
were neither ready to adopt nor advocate doctrines that 
could easily lead to civil war. 
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Following the Toomer report, a protest was read in the 
state legislature. Joseph W. Townsend presented a speech in 
which he justified his and his colleagues' votes against the 
resolutions based upon his beliefs that while "no one State 
can Nullify a law of the Union and still be a member 
thereof," a sovereign state did have a right to "peaceably 
withdraw from the compact" and in such case "the majority of 
the States would ... have no more right to coerce her into 
submission." Townsend felt that it was "uncalled for 
untimed and ungenerous toward a sister State" to pass 
resolutions against South Carolina when that state was 
exerting herself for the cause of the whole South to free 
itself from the protective system.45 Townsend brought out a 
major point of discontent about the resolutions: despite 
Toomer's report to the legislature affirming the right of 
the oppressed to revolt, the finished copy (see Appendix) 
failed to deny or confirm the right of secession. That was 
the crux of the problem given South Carolina's intention of 
withdrawing from the Union if Jackson used military force 
against her. The resolutions said nothing about what North 
Carolina would do in this case. They also did not call for 
a southern convention. The only solution advocated by the 
resolution was to lower the tariff. This was a weak showing 
for a state professing such a strong adherence to the 
states' rights doctrine. 
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The people of North Carolina received the Toomer 
resolutions with mixed feelings. The National Republicans 
proclaimed that the measure was too lenient towards South 
Carolina and denied that a majority of North Carolinians 
believed the tariff to be unconstitutional. The New Bern 
Spectator expressed disappointed that a resolution approving 
the use of military force against the nullifiers was not 
added.46 The Branch presses also condemned the resolutions, 
declaring them an aid to the "tariffites."47 Legislator 
James Whitaker, a member of the Branch faction from Macon 
County, wrote that the resolutions encouraged strife "by 
crying hurra one, well done the other" to the manufacturers 
and South Carolina. He also asked, "how many of us are 
willing to shoulder our knapsack and gun, and march against 
South Carolina? ... What! shoot his neighbor? Did I say his 
neighbor? His Brother! His Son! His Father!"48 The 
regular Democrat press, the Raleigh Register gave high 
praise to the resolutions, "Thus has North Carolina 
emphatically spoken out, and by this one act, ·acquired 
additional claim to the character of a consistent, truly 
Republican and patriotic State."49 
One way Democrats could help the president was to 
support the Verplanck Bill, a compromise tariff supported by 
Jackson that was appealing to the South because it cut 
duties in half by 1834, but disliked by protectionists 
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because it reduced tariff rates too rapidly. North Carolina 
Democrats put considerable faith in this bill. Thomas Hall, 
a Jacksonian, proclaimed that "if Verplanck's Bill passes 
it will cure all."so William Haywood, Jr., a prominent 
politician from New Bern, wrote that the "madness of our 
more Southern brethren has ... perhaps destroyed the 
democratic ranks." But after the "cloud of fear" passed 
over, distinguished Democrats like Van Buren could "bring 
back this country to a recollection that Republican 
Democracy is a medium between the anarchy of Nullification 
and despotism."Sl 
In Congress, North Carolinians began a campaign to get 
the Verplanck Bill passed. The same problems arose, 
however, as had during the vote on the Tariff of 1832. Most 
North Carolina congressmen were against the protective 
system in principle, and only some would vote for any 
tariff, even if reduced. Bedford Brown, a Jackson Democrat, 
took the floor in the Senate on Christmas Eve to urge that 
the Senate continue to debate the tariff when William King 
of Alabama moved that debate halt pending action by the 
House. Brown felt that the crisis at hand wa~ of ''such deep 
importance" that the Senate should act at once to restore 
the harmony, unity, and integrity of the Union.52 
In the House, North Carolinians had drastically 
differing views of the Verplanck Bill. Jacksonian Jesse 
Speight was for a compromise tariff if it provided for 
eventual reduction to the point of revenue. Speight wrote 
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to his constituents that they should have faith in Congress 
to further reduce the tariff but cautioned that the 
reduction may not happen during the spring session; there 
were too many congressmen opposed to compromise.53 William 
Shepard, Congressman from Elizabeth City, had a far 
different view of the situation. Shepard questioned if 
passing a compromise tariff would satisfy South Carolina, 
or, if "she will not, in fact, make its passage the occasion 
of urging demands of a still more humiliating character?" 
The staunch National Republican condemned South Carolina for 
asking, ''in a tone of proud and insulting defiance," 
Congress to abandon the protective system.54 
By February, frustration had mounted at the inability 
of Congress to make headway toward passing a compromise 
tariff to defuse the crisis. Charles Ransom, editor of the 
Raleigh Constitutionalist, despaired of Congress ever 
passing or repealing the tariff laws. He soundly condemned 
the "shylocks of the North" who could understand nothing but 
their "sordid passions" and the "jingling of dollars and 
cents" when the "Demon of discord" and sword of civil war 
dangled over the heads of the country. Ransom said that 
"tho the pillars of the constitution should one by one 
crumble to pieces and overwhelm our country in one common 
ruin, they would still cling with pertinacious grasp to 
their favorite idol and cry amidst desolation Tariff! 
Tariff! no reduction! no reduction!"55 The Advocate blamed 
Jackson's Proclamation for the inability of Congress to 
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compromise.56 The Star saw by early February that the 
Verplanck Bill had no hope of passing in acceptable form.57 
On February 12, 1833, the Star's prediction proved correct. 
The Verplanck Bill was withdrawn from debate. In its place 
Henry Clay substituted another bill. 
Henry Clay's compromise tariff traded time, which was 
important to manufacturers as a guarantee of their profits, 
for principle which was most important to the South. While 
the northern interests would have nine and a half years to 
rewrite the tariff before it was reduced to revenue levels 
(and most of the reduction was in the last few years of that 
time), southerners would have the satisfaction of seeing the 
tariff thus reduced. Both sides did indeed sacrifice, and a 
true compromise was entered into in the interest of 
preserving the Union.58 
The introduction of Clay's compromise tariff gave North 
Carolinians hope for the peaceful end to the nullification 
crisis. While many of the state's newspapers denounced Clay 
as a presidential candidate and as the author of the odious 
American system, they nevertheless respected his reputation 
as the Great Compromiser gained as a result of his actions 
in the Missouri Compromise. The Raleigh Star likened Clay's 
intervention to a mariner long at sea seeing the first light 
of dawn after a storm-swept night. The editors saw in 
Clay's bill forbearance and concession worthy of the 
constitutional era and felt that the compromise would 
"ensure a just and wholesome administration of the 
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government," heal the various divisions in the Union, 
"silence the voice of discontent, and strengthen the ties 
which bind together."59 
The National Republican press at first responded with 
confusion to Clay's compromise. The Register immediately 
heaped praise on Clay: "Mr. Clay appeared, like the genius 
of patriotism and eloquence, strengthening the faint-
hearted, encouraging the doubtful, animating the 
distrusting, and sternly and triumphantly rebuking the 
rebellious and disaffected."60 The New Bern Spectator 
lamented the fact that the "traitors" were not going to be 
hung. Pasteur and company admitted that "we are truly 
astonished at Mr. Clay's new move," because it appeared that 
he had intervened with a compromise that would hurt the 
American System when no compromise was needed by the 
situation.61 President Jackson was going to enforce the 
laws, and the Verplanck tariff, which was very much a repeal 
of the protective system, was doomed. Thus, Clay's bill was 
unnecessary. Furthermore, Jackson was apparently ready to 
put South Carolina down by the sword. The unpopularity that 
this would cause the old general would surely aid the 
National Republicans in the election in 1836. By March, the 
editors returned to their old favorite from Kentucky. The 
compromise tariff gave them abundant reason to proclaim once 
again the merits of Henry Clay.62 The tariff also solved 
the dilemma of being of National Republican sentiment and 
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praising Andrew Jackson. The Spectator soon returned to its 
policy of bashing the moves of Old Hickory.63 
At least one Jacksonian press was skeptical of the 
efforts of Jackson's political rivals to heal the breach 
that they -- Clay as the "father of the American system" and 
Calhoun as the "father of nullification" -- had caused. The 
New Bern Sentinel editorialized: 
After distracting and harassing the country, 
and creating jealousies and discontent among 
the people, Mr. Clay all at once assumes the 
character of mediator ... and holds out the 
olive branch to Mr. Calhoun, which that 
gentleman in his anxiety to escape the evils 
of Nullification seizes with an avidity such 
as the drowning man exhibits when catching at 
straws. 
Further, the paper had faith that Congress could repair "in 
one or two years" what Clay's compromise proposed to do in 
ten. 64 
At the same time as the drama of the Verplanck and Clay 
tariffs was being played out, there was another uproar when 
Jackson demanded an "enforcement bill" to use against the 
nullifiers in South Carolina. The Force Bill was the way in 
which Jackson planned to outmaneuver the nullifiers. He 
would establish floating customs houses outside South 
Carolina's harbors, collect all duties in cash, establish 
jails for those who did not pay, and protect custom 
officials' property by making crimes against them subject to 
trial in federal court. While Jackson already had the 
power, granted by the Constitution, to enforce the law, he 
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wanted Congress to pass the Force Bill to show solidarity in 
support of the federal government.65 Because of the strong 
measures the Judiciary Committee on the Force Bill 
recommended, the debate in the Senate was prolonged and the 
passage of the bill delayed.66 
In North Carolina, the Branch press condemned the 
"bloody bill" heartily.67 While Branch's group did not 
advocate nullification, they felt that the federal 
government had interpreted the principles of the 
Constitution too loosely in regard to the tariff, internal 
improvements, and the enumeration of powers.68 The Star 
claimed that the president's request would give the 
tariffites enough confidence to refuse to compromise. Its 
editors waxed eloquent, if not jubilant: 
the hope of the world will be blasted; 
the sun of our national glory will go down 
in blood; and the night of desolation and despair, 
--sable goddess! from her ebon [sic) throne, 
In rayden majesty will then stretch forth 
Her leaden sceptre [sic) o'er 
"the deserted alters of Religion, the demolished temples of 
Liberty, the ashes of the Constitution, and the broken and 
disjointed fragments of a once glorious Union."69 The Star 
awaited the "Fatal First" of February with "trembling 
anxiety. "70 
The other party organs also responded to the Force 
Bill. The National Republicans approved of Jackson's 
request. The Register was sure that if civil war did come, 
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North Carolina would rally to the federal government.71 The 
Force Bill caused trouble for the Jacksonians in North 
Carolina, however. The Jackson-Van Buren faction was caught 
between their states' rights principles and their devotion 
to Old Hickory, who appeared to be ignoring these 
principles. The Constitutionalist did take an uncomfortable 
stand by warning that "blood can never cement our Union."72 
In the Senate, Bedford Brown apologized for speaking 
against the administration in denouncing the Force Bill. 
Brown stated that he had to follow his heart and also to 
respect the instructions of his state legislature. These 
two dictates pushed him towards finding a peaceful remedy. 
The Force Bill, he believed, "would be attended with 
violence, and perhaps lead to civil war." Brown objected to 
establishing a precedent for positioning the military over 
the civil authority, which he believed would essentially 
change the essence and spirit of republican institutions and 
open the way for a dictatorship. The North Carolina Senator 
affirmed his belief in states' rights while condemning 
nullification by blaming its rise on the "improper pressure 
of the Federal Government on the rights of the States." The 
principle of mutual deference and conciliation in which the 
Constitution had been formed needed to be administered in 
this crisis. Thus, the correct action for Congress was to 
eliminate the amount of tariff over the needs of the 
government.73 
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In the House, the Force Bill fueled the fires started 
by partisan politics and the controversy over nullification 
itself. Samuel Carson also broke with Jackson. He 
proclaimed that Jackson's popularity gave him the 
opportunity to do great good for the country -- or to wreck 
it. Jackson appeared determined to do the latter. The 
injury that the president was apparently intent on 
inflicting on South Carolina would affect the entire country 
by throwing it into civil war. Thus, he voted against the 
Force Bill.74 Others remained true Jacksonians. When 
George McDuffie of South Carolina rose to suggest changing 
the title of the revenue collection bill to "An Act to 
Subvert the Sovereignty of the States of this Union, to 
Establish a Consolidated Government without Limitation of 
Powers, and to make the Civil Subordinate to the Military 
Power," Jesse Speight delivered the coup de grace to the 
nullifiers by "demanding the previous question" and thus 
killing McDuffie's motion.75 
As it became apparent that Jackson was intent on 
forcing South Carolina to conform, that other southern 
states did not approve of its actions, and that Congress 
seemed willing to at least consider reducing the tariff, 
anxiety rose as to whether the nullifiers would grant the 
government a reprieve. The Register printed To the Infidel, 
a poetic injunction to South Carolina: 
Oh! steal not thou my faith away, 
nor tempt to doubt the trusting mind; 
Let all that Earth can yield decay, 
But leave this heavenly gift behind: 
Our life is but a meteor gleam 
Lit up amid surrounding gloom, 
A dying lamp, a fitful beam, 
Quenched in the cold and silent tomb. 
Yet hush, thou troubled heart! be still; 
Renounce thy vain philosophy; 
Like mourning on the misty hill, 
The light of Truth will break on thee. 
Go, search the prophet's deathless page; 
Go, question thou the radiant sky; 
And learn from them mistaken sage! 
The glorious words -- 'Thou shalt not die. ·76 
Robert Hayne and other South Carolina nullifiers finally 
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granted Congress the reprieve that many in North Carolina 
felt was necessary to alleviate the situation. The Raleigh 
Star expressed hope that a similar concession would come 
from Congress.77 Until Clay's intervention, it looked as if 
there would be no compromise. 
When the President lost interest in the Verplanck Bill 
and determined to pass the Force Bill through Congress, Clay 
saw an opportunity to raise his political stakes. He met 
with Calhoun and effected a compromise that both could 
accept. Clay introduced his Compromise Tariff before the 
Senate voted on the Force Bill. In the political wrangling 
that followed, an agreement was made in which southerners, 
including Brown and Mangum, would not vote on the Force Bill 
(which most were ardently against), while many northerners 
would not vote on the Compromise Tariff (which some strongly 
opposed). In this way, the Verplanck Tariff, which was much 
more favorable to the South but amended into unmanageable 
form, was allowed to die.78 
Both the Force Bill and Compromise Tariff passed 
Congress, and within days were signed into law by the 
president. Brown did not vote on either measure, while 
Mangum voted only for the Compromise Tariff.79 In the 
House, all congressmen from North Carolina voted for the 
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final version of the Tariff of 1833, but the Force Bill vote 
was much more representative of their various sentiments. 
The Branch men (except Branch himself who did no vote), 
Abraham Rencher and Samuel Carson plus Jacksonians Thomas H. 
Hall, and Henry Connor all followed their states' rights 
leanings and voted against the Force Bill. Independents 
Daniel Barringer, William Shepard, Augustine Shepperd, and 
Lewis Williams all voted for the bill, as did Jacksonians 
Micajah Hawkins, Lauchlin Bethune, James McKay, and Jesse 
Speight.(see Figure 5)80 
The votes on these two bills were greeted in North 
Carolina by sighs of relief for the compromise tariff and 
languishing over the possibility of Jackson using the Force 
Bill. On March 1, 1833, the day the Force Bill and 
Compromise Tariff passed Congress, the Branch ·presses were 
already praising the consistency and principles of Mangum 
and Brown.81 The Star announced: 
GLORIOUS HEWS! 
Now is the Winter of our discontent 
Made glorious summer. 
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The editors took great pleasure in proclaiming that Clay's 
bill "to reduce the tariff and save the Union" had passed 
both houses. However, the editors observed, the "Enforcing 
Bill" had also passed. The editors deemed it unnecessary, 
that "it is an act of supererogation and will stand on the 
pages of the statute book only as a memorial of folly and 
superfluous legisl~tion."82 The National Republican press 
was not to be outdone. The Register was again poetic in 
spreading the news of the passage of Clay's bill: 
Oh! waft the glad tidings, ye winds as ye blow, 
Oh! hear it ye waves as ye rollt83 
With the passage of the compromise tariff and South 
Carolina's rescinding the Ordinance of Nullification in 
March 1833, the crisis that had raged for months -- years 
actually -- ended. Andrew Jackson stood out in his 
political rhetoric, his tough stand, and his ideological 
contribution to the concept of Union. Henry Clay cashed in 
on the political plaudits of seeing through another "great" 
compromise. South Carolina's protest brought about a 
favorable modification of the tariff. And North Carolinians 
actively participated in almost every aspect of the 
controversy. Most of them agreed that the important thing 
had occurred: the Union was peacefully preserved. 
Throughout the crisis North Carolina politicians 
wrestled with their conflicting values of devotion to the 
Union and attachment to states' rights. As long as no 
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threat was made to the Union, they loudly proclaimed the 
doctrines of state sovereignty. When the lines were drawn, 
however, these same politicians performed as politicians 
always have -- they switched horses -- and announced eternal 
love for the Union. Part of this must have been due to the 
tremendous popularity of Andrew Jackson. Some may be 
credited to a sense of nationalism articulated in the 
Nullification Proclamation. Finally, one must consider that 
no man should ever be desirous of civil war. Whatever the 
cause, North Carolina spoke one way before the hardening of 
the crisis in November and December 1832, and acted another 
way afterward. 
In the battle for political survival, those who allied 
too closely with the nullifiers were crippled in the 
elections in the fall of 1833. Samuel Carson, the only 
avowed North Carolinian nullifier in Congress, lost in his 
bid for reelection to James Graham of the National 
Republican faction. Carson posted the GTT sign (Gone To 
Texas) and a very short while later became the Secretary of 
State of the Republic of Texas (1836-8). John Branch did 
not run again, but his chosen successor was beaten badly. 
Branch remained in the state long enough (he later served as 
governor of Florida) to help create the Whig Party. For the 
time being, their political fortunes were destroyed by their 
association with Calhoun and his radical theory. Neither 
longstanding public servant (eighteen years between them in 
both houses of Congress, including Branch's stint as 
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Secretary of the Navy) held public office in the state again 
(and both were young men, in 1833 Carson was thirty-three 
and Branch fifty-one).84 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION: AN APPRAISAL OF THE 
NULLIFICATION CRISIS IN 
NORTH CAROLINA 
I would then address the people in their primary 
assemblies; and would tell them of the grievances under 
which they had long labored, and of their great 
forbearance .•. I would then talk to them about 
nullification; but it should be warlike, not peaceful; 
and then, and not till then, would I gird on my sword 
and proclaim liberty or death." 
Walter F. Leake 
The nullification crisis left a mixed legacy in North 
Carolina. On the one hand there was devotion to Andrew 
Jackson and the Union. On the other, was attachment to 
states' rights, in this case represented by John C. Calhoun. 
These conflicting ideals caused confusion and conflicts in 
the state that made it difficult for politicians to 
formulate policy in a state that had perhaps the most 
important location in the country in regard to the 
settlement of the crisis. If the state's politicians 
resisted Andrew Jackson's use of force to quell the 
disruption in South Carolina, civil war would likely result. 
Conversely, if the state's leaders did allow Jackson to 
march federal troops across North Carolina's borders, then 
South Carolina and its stand against the protective tariff 
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that was seen as oppressive to the entire South would be 
crushed. 
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Based upon the resolutions adopted by the state 
legislature, the nullification crisis showed several 
important priorities of North Carolina politicians. First, 
devotion to the Union was seemingly unanimous. This 
Unionist sentiment revolved around the idea that the Union, 
while perhaps not perpetual, was beneficial for the state at 
the time. 
Second, attachment to the Constitution was apparently 
universal. This caused considerable confusion because of 
the states' rights view that the Constitution should be 
strictly interpreted. Strict interpretation was a means by 
which the South, as a minority in the legislative process, 
sought protection against such things as oppressive tariffs. 
Many in the new nation, and in North Carolina specifically, 
believed that if the majority did begin to oppress the 
minority, then a state had the sovereign power to withdraw 
from the Union if the people did not rise up to overthrow 
the government. Some saw this obligation as a right of 
violent rebellion in the fashion of the American Revolution. 
Jesse Speight maintained as early as May 1832 that while a 
state did not have the right to nullify a federal law, it 
always retained the right of revolution.l John c. Calhoun's 
doctrine of nullification did not fit this criteria, for it 
was proposed as a peaceful means of preserving the Union.2 
Others abhorred the thought of violence and proclaimed that 
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the right of secession should be granted by the other states 
peacefully. Nathaniel Macon, one of the patriarchs of North 
Carolina politics, wrote in March of 1833: "I am still for 
the Union, no nullifier, nor an approver of the 
[Nullification) Proclamation; [I] believe that a state may 
quit the Union when she pleases ... the right to quit, is 
the best and almost the only guard against oppression."3 
The resolutions also condemned the tariff as being 
oppressive and unconstitutional. North Carolinians 
generally had no wish to destroy the manufacturing interests 
of the North, but only wanted to relieve the South of a 
share of the tariff burden that they thought had assumed 
unjust proportions. Throughout the crisis, North 
Carolinians were torn by conflicting views. Based upon 
their love of the Union, they sought compromise and a 
revision of protective duties. Their constitutional 
interpretation, however, consigned them to demanding the 
immediate repeal of the protective system. Henry Clay's 
Compromise Tariff worked, because it satisfied these demands 
while being acceptable to the North also.4 
Finally, few thought that the doctrine of· nullification 
had any constitutional basis. While both states' rights 
factions believed that an oppressed state could rebel, the 
idea of nullifying a federal law was not popular. The 
Branch group, the more radical of the two, followed the lead 
of Calhoun, although they denied that the South Carolinian 
promoted nullification, preferring to call it the "Virginia 
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Doctrine of States Rights" based upon the Virginia and 
Kentucky Resolutions. This faction held that secession was 
acceptable, especially if President Jackson tried to use 
force against South Carolina. The regular Democrats were 
more moderate, and denounced Calhoun's theory and 
nullification as one and the same (which they were). When 
Jackson asked for the Force Bill, however, regular Democrats 
asserted that secession was an acceptable means of redress. 
This seems to be intellectual dishonesty, because secession 
was a more radical action than nullification. Only with 
difficulty could one deny nullification and yet maintain 
secession theoretically. 
When trying to pinpoint why North Carolinians reacted 
the way they did in regard to nullification one must 
consider the tremendous popularity of the president, Andrew 
Jackson. Jackson was elected in both 1828 and 1832 by 
landslides and was seen as the first "people's president." 
The seemingly people approved of Jackson's Nullification 
Proclamation and his advocacy of the Verplanck Bill to 
modify the tariff. He retained the loyalty of.most of the 
people in the state until he advocated the Forbe Bill, which 
many saw as allowing the executive too much power and 
threatening states' rights doctrine. Yet, if states' rights 
was that important, why did the people not abandon Jackson 
altogether when he threatened to usurp them? One 
explanation could be that regular Democrats would not accept 
nullification because of its connection to John C. Calhoun. 
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Many saw Calhoun's change of heart from nationalist after 
the War of 1812 to states' rightist in the 1820s as 
political opportunism. Further, his "betrayal" of Jackson 
by writing the South Carolina Exposition and Protest while 
vice president did not sit well.s Another reason why 
regular Democrats may have advocated secession while denying 
nullification was that secession was always regarded in 
''future" terms, whereas nullification was a present danger. 
As long as secession could be kept as a future option, it 
could be discussed in theoretically. 
Finally, one must consider that while regular Democrats 
did not reject the idea of secession, they did not actively 
promote it, either. Only if Jackson used military force 
against South Carolina was there a chance the North Carolina 
would secede, and even this may well have been political 
rhetoric. One can say for sure only that the regular 
Democrats expressed attachment to the Union, but not a 
perpetual Union. 
William Freehling hypothesizes that there were three 
overriding reasons why South Carolina adopted nullification, 
but no other state followed: a peculiar economic condition, 
heightened racial fears, and cooperation between piedmont 
and tidewater politicians. South Carolina experienced soil 
depletion later than did Virginia and North Carolina. By 
the 1820s and 1830s, these two states had adjusted to this 
condition. South Carolina had the misfortune of facing 
declining profits due to soil problems while confronting a 
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glut of the cotton market because of the production of 
virgin soil states such as Mississippi and Alabama. 
Declining profits caused disaffection among piedmont cotton 
growers.6 
North Carolina also faced economic woes. The state had 
long been considered an economic backwater. In part, this 
was due to thin soil and the mountains in the western part 
of the state.? Another factor, one that received a lot of 
attention in the state throughout the 1830s, was lack of 
roads and railroads. North Carolina farmers had no reason 
to grow surplus crops, because they could not get them to 
market. Coastal towns could not establish ports because of 
sandbars. Those that did were hampered by the Outer Banks, 
islands that flank almost the entire coast of the state, 
requiring a considerable detour to reach the open waters of 
the Atlantic. This problem was studied, and measures were 
taken to rectify it. The railroads that were built, 
however, were never very successful.8 
Another factor peculiar to South Carolina was the 
black-to-white ratio. Blacks were almost a two-thirds 
majority in the state. This brought on fear of slave 
revolts and, more threateningly, the fear of being swamped 
in a sea of black if the slaves were ever freed. South 
Carolinians feared that if Congress could establish and 
enforce an ''unconstitutional" law such as the protective 
tariff, then it could pass an emancipation law as well.9 
Thus, any tolerance for a violation of a strict 
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interpretation of the Constitution led down a slippery slope 
to emancipation. 
To the north, North Carolinians had a different 
situation in that only a few counties had a majority of 
negroes (see Figure 6). Further, North Carolina, because of 
its agricultural problems, was rapidly losing its slave 
population as they were sold, or moved with their owners, to 
the southwestern states.lO There exists an interesting 
correlation with Freehling's hypothesis: the county with 
the highest black to white ratio contained the Advocate, the 
only newspaper to adopt the doctrine of nullification (see 
Table I). A heavy concentration of those who voted against 
the resolution to condemn nullification came from these 
counties, also. Furthermore, the leader of the Branch 
faction, John Branch, resided in Edenton, Halifax County. 
While Branch was not a nullifier, he did support Calhoun and 
the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, and his faction was 
the more radical states' rightist of the two Democratic 
factions in the state. Thus, Freehling's racial hypothesis 
seems to hold up when applied to North Carolina. 
Freehling's last theory is that a unique ·cooperation 
existed between tidewater sugar cane and rice growers (who 
still received great profits) and upcountry cotton planters 
who faced economic woes due to the glut of the cotton 
market. Interestingly, the tidewater growers took the lead 
in the nullification movement. Most Unionists lived in the 
piedmont and western part of the state, and while the rice 
Figure 6. Counties with a Black to White 
Ratio Rhove 1:1. 
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and sugar planters did not face the economic threat as the 
cotton growers did, the tidewater counties contained the 
greatest concentration of blacks in the country.ll This 
solidarity allowed popular sectional politicians to unite 
behind Calhoun and his nullification stand. 
North Carolina had little such cooperation. 
Factionalism reigned there as sectional leaders slandered 
each other.12 Many in the west gave their support to the 
American System, realizing that without government funding 
for internal improvements (roads and railroads), they could 
never farm profitably. In the east, there were some who 
felt that the Bank of the United States was the key. If the 
Bank was maintained, North Carolina could establish banks 
under its protection and provide more money for the state. 
Others in the east realized that without government help, 
building railroads and dredging harbors would be out of the 
question.13 Opposing these pro-American System viewpoints 
was the majority of the people and politicians. They 
believed that the Constitution made no provision for the 
Bank of the United States and federally funded internal 
improvements. Furthermore, adding to their states' rights 
principles was an adoration for Andrew Jackson, who was 
generally against internal improvements and hated the Bank 
with vengeance.l4 Freehling is right; North Carolina 
exhibited little of the sectional solidarity of her 
nullifying sister to the south. 
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Richard Ellis describes the effect of the nullification 
crisis on two other southern states: Georgia and Virginia. 
Georgia seemed similar to both of the Carolinas. Politics 
were confused in the absence of parties aligned with the 
"second party system," as in North Carolina. Georgia also 
professed a strong attachment to states' rights and had even 
gone so far as to ignore a Supreme Court order when the 
Court ordered the state and its people to stop persecuting 
the Cherokees. The state, however, did not rally to South 
Carolina's cause, although it contained a vocal minority of 
nullifiers. Again, as in North Carolina, the people seemed 
to feel that states' rights, in theoretical and rhetorical 
terms, was one thing, but taking action on these principles 
by nullifying a federal law by an act of the state 
legislature was another.lS 
Virginia also faced this dilemma. A state that was the 
home of both Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, it was 
always looked upon as the leader of the southern states. 
Virginia politicians had always taken constitutional 
arguments seriously. Like North Carolina, Virginia was 
strategically located: if Jackson wished to subdue South 
Carolina militarily, federal troops would have to march 
through these two states. Thus, either, or both, by denying 
this transportation route, could effectively cut Jackson off 
from enforcing the law in South Carolina. Further, the two 
states did not have to adopt the doctrine of nullification 
to justify securing their borders. Very few people in 
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either state would grant the federal government the right to 
coerce militarily a "sovereign'' state. Perhaps if any state 
should have gone to the rescue of South Carolina, it should 
have been Virginia. Although it did not have the 
concentration of blacks nor the acute economic problems of 
South Carolina, it did have some similarities. Most 
important was the nature of its states' rights tradition. 
As the horne of the two founders of states' rights and the 
authors of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, the state 
had a nullification background. Calhoun's doctrine was 
really not theoretically different from Jefferson's (the 
means of implementing nullification probably were --
Jefferson's views on this were incomplete). Furthermore, 
many in Virginia, as in North Carolina, condemned 
nullification while maintaining the state's right to secede. 
Thus, Virginia projected the same traits as North Carolina: 
confusion and inconclusiveness toward the doctrinal issues 
raised during the crisis.16 
North Carolina was not different from its sister states 
of the South. Neither was it entirely negative toward South 
Carolina and nullification as some portray it based upon the 
resolutions adopted by the legislature.17 While the 
resolutions did proclaim attachment to the Union, they did 
not state that the Union was perpetual, for while 
nullification was condemned, it was not the only method by 
which a state could break away from the Union (indeed 
nullification did not even have this purpose). The right to 
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rebel was never doubted in any of the newspapers or by any 
political figure; only whether the time had come to rebel 
was debatable. Secession was not denounced by the 
legislature, and if a state maintained this right, then it 
tacitly denied that the Union was perpetual. 
Thus, the question was not whether North Carolina truly 
maintained states' rights doctrines. Many in the state did, 
in one form or another. Nor was the question whether North 
Carolina would put these beliefs into effect. The question 
was over the proper means of implementing these doctrines. 
Nullification, peacefully denying federal law while a part 
of the Union, was not proper. In order to nullify, a state 
must be willing to rend the Union asunder by secession, and 
maintain its stand in winning a civil war. 
ENDNOTES 
1sentinel (New Bern), 9 May 1832. 
2see Richard E. Ellis, The Union at Risk: Jacksonian 
Democracy, States' Rights, and the Nullification Crisis (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1987), Chapters 1,2 
3Nathaniel Macon to Martin Van Buren, 2 March 1833, 
"Unpublished Letters from North Carolina to Van Buren," ed. 
Elizabeth McPherson, North Carolina Historical Review 15 
(1938): 57. 
4Merrill D. Peterson, Olive Branch and Sword: The 
Compromise of 1833 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1982), 66-7. 
5see Ellis, Union at Risk, Chapter 9 "The Nullification 
Crisis and Jacksonian Democracy," 178-198. 
6william w. Freehling, Prelude to Civil War: The 
Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836 (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1966), 203-4. 
?cornelius o. Cathey, Agricultural Developments in 
North Carolina, 1873-1860 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1956), 194. 
8see John F. Stover, The Railroads of the South: 1865-
1900 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1955); and George R. Taylor, The Transportation Revolution 
110 
111 
(New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1951); and Hugh T. 
Lefler, North Caorlina History as Told by Contemporaries 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 
140-201 passim. Stover's introduction has some background 
information on railroads before the Civil War and Taylor 
gives a complete history of the development of canals, 
roads, and railroads. Lefler gives primary sources such as 
legislative reports on the need for roads, railroads, and 
the movement of the population due to economic forces. 
9Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, 203-4. 
10Lefler, Contemporaries, 205-6. 
11Freehling, Prelude to Civil War, 203-4. 
12Hugh Lefler, North Carolina: The History of a 
Southern State (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1973), 419. 
13Lefler, Contemporaries, 205-6. 
14see William S. Hoffman, Andrew Jackson and North 
Carolina Politics (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1958), Chapter 7 "North Carolina Politicians 
in the National Crisis of 1833," 58-68. 
15see Ellis, Union at Risk, Chapter 5 "G~orgia and the 
Nullification Crisis," 102-122. 
16see ibid., Chapter 6 "Virginia and the Nullification 
Crisis," 123-140. 
17These authors are: Kermalene K. Brown, "The South's 
Reaction to the Tariffs and the Force Bill" (Ph.D. diss., 
Oklahoma State University, 1971); Herman Ames, ed., State 
112 
Documents on Federal Relations: The States and the United 
States (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1906); 




Constitutionalist, People's Advocate, and State Gazette 
(Raleigh). 4 November 1831-1 May 1833. 
Free Press (Tarboro). 1 July 1831-1 May 1833. 
North Carolina Journal (Fayetteville). 1 July 1831-1 May 
1833. 
North Carolina Sentinel (New Bern). 1 July 1831-1 May 1833. 
North Carolina Spectator and Western Advertiser 
(Rutherfordton). 1 July 1831-1 May 1833. 
Register and North Carolina Gazette (Raleigh). 1 July 
1831-1 May 1833. 
Roanoke Advocate (Halifax). 1 July 1831-7 February 1833. 
Spectator (New Bern). 1 July 1831-1 May 1833. 
Star and North Carolina Eastern Intelligencer (Elizabeth 
City). 1 July 1831-1 May 1833. 
Star and North Carolina State Gazette (Raleigh). 1 July 
1831-1 May 1833. 
Other Published Documents 
Ames, Herman, ed. State Documents on Federal Relations: 
The States and the United States. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania, 1906. 
Bassett, John Spencer, ed. Correspondence of Andrew 
Jackson. 4 vols. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Institute, 
1935. 
Biggs, Asa. Autobiography of Asa Biggs, Including a 
113 
Journal of a Trip from North Carolina to New York 
in 1832. Raleigh: Edwards, 1958. 
114 
Journals of the Senate and House of Commons of the General 
Assembly of the State of North Carolina at the Session 
of 1832-1833. Raleigh: Charles R. Ramsey, 1833. 
McPherson, Elizabeth B. ed. "Unpublished Letters from North 
Carolina to Van Buren," in North Carolina Historical 
Review 15 (1938): 53-81. 
Shanks, Henry T., ed. 
7 vols., Raleigh: 
The Papers of Willie Person Mangum. 





Correspondence of James K. Polk. 5 vols., 
Vanderbuilt University Press, 1969. 
Books 
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 
1774-1989. Washington D.C.: United States Government 
Printing Office, 1989. 
Boucher, Chauncey Samuel. The Nullification Controversy 
in South Carolina. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1916. 
Boyd, William K. 
1584-1876. 
A Syllabus of North Carolina History, 
Durham, NC: The Seeman Printery, 1913. 
History of North Carolina: The Federal Period, 
1783-1860. Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Company, 
1919. 
Cathey, Cornelius 0. Agricultural Developments in North 
Carolina, 1783-1860. Chapel Hill: Unive.rsity of 
North Carolina Press, 1956. 
Censur, Jane T. North Carolina Planters and their Children: 
1800-1860. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1984. 
Concise Dictionary of American Biography. New York: 
Scribner's Sons, 1990. 
Cooper, William. The South and the Politics of Slavery. 
Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978. 
Crow, Jeffrey J. and Larry E. Tise, eds. Writing North 
Carolina History. Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1979. 
Cyclopedia of Eminent and Representative Men of the 
Carolinas of the Nineteenth Century. Madison, WI: 
Brant and Fuller, 1892. 
115 
Ellis, Richard E. The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, 
States' Rights, and the Nullification Crisis. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1987. 
Frehling, William W. Prelude to Civil War: The 
Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836. 
New York: Harper and Row, 1966. 
Hoffman, William S. Andrew Jackson and North Carolina 
Politics. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1958. 
Lefler, Hugh T. North Carolina History as Told by 
Contemporaries. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1965. 
North Carolina: The Historv of a Southern State. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973. 
McCormick, Richard P. The Second American Party System. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966. 
Martis, Kenneth C. The Congressional Atlus of United States 
Conoressional Districts: 1789-1983. New York: The 
Free Press, 1982. 
Members of Conoress Since 1879. Washington D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1985. 
Peterson, Merrill D. Olive Branch and Sword: The 
Compromise of 1833. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1982. 
Phillips, Ulrich B. The Course of the South to Secession; 
An Interpretation bv Ulrich Bonnell Phillips Merton 
Coulter, ed. New York: D. Appleton - Century Company, 
Inc., 1939. 
Powell, Edward P. Nullification and Secession in the United 
States; A History of the Six Attempts During the First 
Century of the Republic. New York: G.P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1897. 
Sellers, Charles D., ed. Andrew Jackson, Nullification, and 
the States Rights Tradition. Chicago: Rand McNally 
116 
and Company, 1963. 
Stover, John F. The Railroads of the South: 1865-1900. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955. 
Sydnor, Charles S. The Development of Southern 
Sectionalism, 1819-1848. Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1948. 
Taussig, Frank W. State Papers and Speeches on the Tariff. 
Cambridge: Harvard University, 1893. 
Taylor, George R. The Transportation Revolution. New York: 
Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1951. 
Warren, Charles. The Supreme Court and Sovereign States. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1924. 
Articles 
Calhoon, Robert M. "A Troubled Culture: North Carolina in 
the New Nation, 1790-1834," Writing North Carolina 
History, eds. Jeffrey J. Crow and Larry E. Tise, 
76-110. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1979. 
Hoffman, William. "John Branch and the Origins of the Whig 
Party in North Carolina," North Carolina Historical 
Review 35 (1958): 299-315. 
Schauinger, Joseph H. "William Gaston: Southern 
Statesman," North Carolina Historical Review 18 
( 1941): 99-132. 
Stampp, Kenneth M. "The Concept of a Perpetual Union," 
Journal of American History 65 (June 1978), 5-33. 
Wilson, Major. "Liberty and Union: An Analysis of Three 
Concepts Involved in the Nullification Controversy," 
Journal of Southern History 33 (August 1962), 
120-139. 
Unpublished Material 
Brown, Kermalene K. "The South's Reaction to the Tariffs 
and the Force Bill, 1828-1833." Ph.D. dissertation, 
Oklahoma State University, 1971. 
APPENDIX 
FINAL RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE 
NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATURE 
ON JANUARY 7, 1833 
Resolved, That the General Assembly of the State of 
North Carolina doth entertain, and doth unequivocally 
express a warm attachment to the Constitution of the United 
States. 
Resolved, That the General Assembly doth solemnly 
declare a devoted attachment to the Federal Union, believing 
that on its continuance depend the liberty, the peace and 
prosperity of these United States. 
Resolved, That whereas diversity of opinion may prevail 
in this State as to the Constitutionality of the Acts of 
Congress imposing duties on imposts; yet it is believed, a 
large majority of the people think those acts 
unconstitutional; and they are all united in the sentiment 
that the existing Tariff is impolitic, unjust and 
oppressive; and they have urged, and will continue to urge 
its repeal. 
Resolved, That the doctrine of Nullification avowed by 
the State of South Carolina, and lately promulgated in an 
Ordinance, is revolutionary in its character, subversive of 
117 
the Constitution of the United States, and leads to a 
dissolution of the Union. 
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Resolved, That our Senators in Congress be instructed 
and our Representatives be requested to use all 
constitutional means in their power, to procure an 
adjustment of the existing controversy between the State of 
South Carolina and the General Government. 
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